Abstract: South Africa’s 2026 Medium Term Budget Policy Statement highlights the gap between defence funding, operational readiness and strategic ambition. Examining budget adjustments, military performance indicators and the unresolved strategic framework, this article considers whether the SANDF can sustain its commitments within the country’s fiscal constraints.
Dr Joan Swart
Keywords: South African National Defence Force; defence budget; military capability; operational readiness; Defence Review; strategic planning; national security
MEDIUM TERM BUDGET POLICY STATEMENT 2026: WHAT DOES IT SHOW ABOUT MILITARY CAPABILITY AND STRATEGY?
South Africa’s Medium Term Budget Policy Statement (MTBPS), presented on 21 October 2026, offers another opportunity to consider a question that extends beyond the amount allocated to Defence: what military capability can the country realistically sustain with the resources available, and how well does that capability match its strategic commitments?
The answer is not found in a single budget figure. It emerges from the relationship between funding, operational performance, competing demands and the strategic framework guiding defence planning. Viewed in this light, the latest adjustments provide a snapshot of a defence establishment managing immediate pressures while the longer-term alignment of its commitments, capabilities and resources remains unresolved.
The Department of Defence’s adjusted appropriation for 2026/27 rises from R57.61 billion to R61.46 billion, an increase of approximately R3.85 billion, or 6.7 per cent. At first glance, this appears encouraging. However, an increase in an annual appropriation does not necessarily represent a corresponding improvement in military capability. The composition of the adjustment, its intended uses and the sustainability of the funding all matter.
Approximately R2.02 billion of the adjustment comprises self-financing expenditure. This includes reimbursements from the Southern African Development Community and the United Nations for South Africa’s peace-support contribution in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, as well as proceeds from the sale of equipment and spares. The additional funding is intended, among other things, to relieve operational pressures and support critical Defence Review requirements.
A further R823 million is allocated to Operation Prosper, under which the South African National Defence Force supports the South African Police Service in combating illegal mining and gangsterism. Other adjustments include funding for the Regular Force Medical Continuation Fund, early retirement and voluntary exits, and expenditure rolled over from the previous financial year.
These allocations serve legitimate purposes, but they are not equivalent to a permanent increase in the resources available for long-term force development. Reimbursements and asset-sale proceeds are not the same as a sustained increase in the underlying funding base. Nor does additional funding for domestic deployments automatically translate into greater capacity for external operations, training or equipment renewal.
The distinction matters because the SANDF is expected to perform several demanding roles simultaneously: safeguarding borders, protecting maritime interests, supporting domestic law-enforcement operations and contributing to regional security. Each requires personnel, equipment, maintenance, logistics and training. Funding one requirement may relieve an immediate pressure without resolving the broader resource constraints affecting the force.
The pressure on defence resources
The medium-term outlook offers little basis for assuming that these constraints will disappear. National Treasury’s 2026 Estimates of National Expenditure projected average annual growth of 1.5 per cent in the Defence vote between 2025/26 and 2028/29, while compensation of employees was expected to account for 65.7 per cent of departmental expenditure over the period. The MTBPS presents a broader functional category, Defence and State Security, whose nominal allocation fluctuates over the medium term rather than following a sustained upward trajectory.
These figures require careful interpretation: the departmental vote and the broader functional category are not directly interchangeable, and nominal growth does not necessarily preserve purchasing power. Nevertheless, they illustrate the difficulty of expanding or regenerating military capability within a constrained fiscal environment. A force cannot indefinitely compensate for inadequate investment in equipment, maintenance and training simply by managing existing resources more tightly.
Operational readiness: The test of expenditure
Operational performance makes this challenge tangible. The 2026 Adjusted Estimates of National Expenditure reported that, by mid-year, the SANDF had accumulated 2,954 flying hours against an annual target of 12,000, and 3,297 hours at sea against a target of 8,000. The department attributed the shortfall in flying hours primarily to delays in sourcing specialised aircraft components, while delays in vessel maintenance and repair affected maritime activity. It expected performance to improve in the second half of the financial year.
These are interim figures, not final annual results, and the department’s expectation of improvement should be acknowledged. Even so, they expose a fundamental feature of military readiness: having aircraft and vessels on an inventory is not the same as having them available for operations. Maintenance capacity, access to specialised components and reliable supply chains determine how much of the nominal force can actually be employed.
The 2026 Estimates provide for additional medium-term funding for fighter maintenance and naval capability. This is important, but the effectiveness of such allocations will ultimately be demonstrated through operational availability and performance, rather than expenditure alone. Persistent shortfalls would also have implications for training, crew proficiency, deterrence and the ability to respond to contingencies.
The unresolved strategic framework
The strategic dimension is equally important. South Africa continues to rely on the South African Defence Review 2015 as a foundational policy reference, despite significant changes in the regional and international security environment since its development. The Department of Defence’s 2026/27 Annual Performance Plan acknowledges the need to evaluate national defence policy and the Defence Review, determine the country’s level of ambition and capability requirements, and establish a sustainable funding model.
The Portfolio Committee on Defence and Military Veterans has also raised concerns about the absence of clarity around the long-term strategic roadmap, including the status of the Journey to Greatness initiative and related policy documents. Its May 2026 report called for the relevant plans to be tabled in Parliament and stressed the need for costed proposals and implementation timelines. The committee’s concerns highlight a difficulty that is easily overlooked in budget discussions: funding decisions cannot be assessed properly without clarity about the force the country intends to maintain and the tasks it expects that force to perform.
This is not merely a procedural matter. A credible defence strategy should connect national interests and security commitments to a defined level of military ambition, a realistic force design and a sustainable funding trajectory. Without that connection, budget allocations risk becoming a succession of responses to immediate pressures rather than instruments for developing coherent military capability.
The question is not whether South Africa should spend more on Defence in isolation from its wider fiscal obligations. It is whether the country has clearly defined the military capabilities it needs, established the costs of maintaining them, and aligned its commitments with what it is prepared to fund. Governance, procurement and financial discipline also matter: additional resources cannot deliver their intended effect if they are absorbed by persistent management weaknesses or fail to reach operational priorities.
For regional and international observers, the implications extend beyond South Africa’s borders. The country’s ability to contribute to regional peace and security, protect its maritime interests and sustain deployments depends on capabilities that must be generated and maintained over time. A gap between declared commitments and available military capacity can narrow strategic options even when the state remains willing to act.
The MTBPS does not, by itself, provide a complete diagnosis of the SANDF’s condition. It does, however, illustrate why the debate should move beyond the headline allocation. The decisive test is whether resources, operational readiness and strategic ambition are brought into alignment. Until that relationship is made explicit and sustained through policy, planning and funding, increases in the Defence budget will remain an incomplete measure of progress.
NONGQAI’S Strategic Security Analyst Dr Joan Swart is a forensic psychologist with an MBA and an MA in Military Studies. Her work focuses on African security, geopolitics, state fragility, substate dynamics, and the intersection between governance, legitimacy, and coercive power. She is the author of several books and regularly publishes long-form analysis and opinion pieces on security and governance issues. Her writing has appeared in outlets including DefenceWeb, Maroela Media, Netwerk24, RSG, Visegrad, and other policy and public-affairs platforms. She has a weekly slot on SAfm The Global Briefing to analyse world affairs. Her work bridges academic research, policy analysis, and applied strategic assessment, and she is currently completing a second PhD at the University of Stellenbosch Military Academy. Follow her on X/Twitter, Substack, LinkedIn, and YouTube.
