Nongqai Vol 17 No 8 – Spying at NATO
Abstract
A Canadian woman of Chinese origin has been arrested for allegedly spying while working as an intern at the military headquarters of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization alliance (Nato), according to Belgian prosecutors.
Canadian officials, including Public Safety Minister Gary Anandasangaree, launched a review of how the suspect passed security screening by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) and Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS).
Key Words
Belgium,
Spying,
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (Nato),
NATO’s military headquarters in Mons – Belgium,
Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe,
(SHAPE),
SHAPE’s IT department,
Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP),
Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS),
Minister Gary Anandasangaree,
Bway Jiang aka Claire or Kina,
China,
Ministry of State Security (MSS),
CANADIAN INTERN SUSPECTED OF SPYING AT NATO HEADQUARTERS IN BELGIUM
Compiled by Wolfgang Witschas
Introduction
On Friday 24 July 2026 an arrest warrant was issued for a Canadian woman of Chinese origin in her 30s, not a student, who was an intern at NATO’s military headquarters, SHAPE, in Mons, Belgium, and on Sunday 25 July 2026 has been arrested on espionage charges, Belgian prosecutors said on Saturday 25 July 2026.
Background
• The Suspect: Bway Jiang (also known as Claire or Kina), a Canadian intern of Chinese origin
• Location: Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) in Mons, Belgium
• Charges: Accused of spying on behalf of a third country and belonging to a criminal group
• Response: Ottawa promised a full review of background screening procedures previously cleared by the Canadian Security Intelligence Service
SHAPE houses NATO’s top military headquarters, the base of Allied Command Operations, which is responsible for planning and carrying out all operations of the 32-member transatlantic security alliance. They monitor Russia’s war in Ukraine. They track threats across the High North and the Indo-Pacific. An insider with access could pass along classified operational plans, partner-nation capabilities or early-warning data. Even limited leaks damage trust.
Suspicion
The suspect had come to the attention of SHAPE’s security services, due to her behaviour which raised alarms, such as staying by Nato’s buildings and asking questions.
Investigators searched the suspect’s home and her workplace at SHAPE, and she was placed under arrest on Friday.
A SHAPE spokesperson said there was no indication that NATO or SHAPE operational readiness, command and control arrangements or ongoing tasks had been affected.
“SHAPE continues to fulfil its responsibilities without interruption,” he said.
Background on Bway Jiang aka Claire or Kina
She arrived in Mons about a year ago (during mid 2025) to start her internship in the IT department of SHAPE. LinkedIn profile cited by sources also lists past work at European Space Agency and World Trade Organisation.
How was she vetted?
According to Shape’s website, depending on the type of work, interns’ host countries are responsible for checking on their security clearance, which in this case would be Canada. The BBC has contacted Canadian police for comment.
“The required time to receive the Security Clearance depends on the national rules of Nato Member States and may take from eight weeks to 18 months,” the Shape website states. “The vetting process starts once you have been selected.”
A spokesperson for Global Affairs Canada confirmed to Canadian news outlets that the government makes the decision to grant, deny or revoke security clearances for Canadians working in international organisations following “security assessments provided by CSIS”, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service.
Epilogue
This is part of a string of alleged espionage cases across Europe in 2026 involving China
NATO Intern Arrest Exposes Alliance Vetting Gaps Amid Espionage Fears
The case lands at a tense moment. NATO has listed China as a systemic challenge since 2021. Beijing rejected the label. It called its military expansion purely defensive. Western officials counter that Chinese intelligence services run persistent campaigns against alliance targets. They recruit insiders. They exploit open positions. Internships offer one route.
The Chinese Intelligence Service, the Ministry of State Security (MSS)
The Chinese Ministry of State Security (MSS) 国家安全部 is China’s civilian intelligence, counterintelligence, and political security agency.
Main tasks:
• Counterespionage: Find and neutralize foreign spies in China. Monitor foreign companies, students, journalists, NGOs
• Foreign Intelligence Collection: Political, economic, military, and tech intelligence abroad
• Domestic Political Security: Protect the Party from “hostile forces”. Covers separatism, dissent, religious groups
• Cyber/Tech Intelligence: IP theft, hacking, and surveillance. Often works with contractors and PLA units
• Counterterrorism & Social Stability: Especially in Xinjiang, Tibet
China targets citizens of foreign countries of Chinese heritage as well as Chinese émigré communities in foreign countries to act as agents for the MSS
How MSS works overseas
Since ∼2015 MSS has been much more active abroad. Methods include:
• “Thousand Grains of Sand”: Using students, researchers, businesspeople to collect small pieces of info
• Cyber ops: Contracted groups linked to APT10, APT40, APT41
• Targeting diaspora: “Fox Hunt” and surveillance of critics abroad
• Tech acquisition: Focusing on AI, aerospace, biotech, semiconductors
This is why several European cases in 2025-2026 named MSS.
Analysts of NATO member’s Intelligence Services have long warned about vetting shortfalls. Intern programs move quickly. Background checks vary by nation. A Canadian passport grants entry to NATO facilities. Yet dual heritage or family ties abroad can complicate assessments. Officials rarely discuss specifics. This arrest forces the conversation into the open and the criminal-organization element stands out. Prosecutors rarely pair espionage with organized-crime charges in these cases. The pairing suggests possible financial motives or links to smuggling networks. Or perhaps a broader influence operation that blends state direction with private actors. Details remain sealed.
Who MSS prioritizes in Europe in 2024-2026
References:
https://www.ctvnews.ca/canada/article/arrested-canadian-nato-intern-suspected-of- spying-for-china-sourches-tell-reuters’2/
https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cwymk20n0v7o
https://global news.ca/news/11989256/canadian-intern-spy-charges/
https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/canadian-intern-nato-spying-9.7283752
