Nongqai Vol 17 No 7 – The Return of Indirect Conflict: Strategy, Risks, and Accountability

KENNISGEWING / NOTICE

Inleiding

Proxy‑oorlogvoering is besig om die wêreld se veiligheidslandskap stil maar ingrypend te verander. Agter baie moderne konflikte skuil ’n onsigbare spel van indirekte mag, geheime borge, plaaslike milisies en digitale invloed – ’n gevaarlike mengsel wat oorlog en vrede laat vervaag. Hierdie artikel ontbloot hoe groot- en streekmoondhede vandag hul belange bevorder sonder om self te veg, waarom hierdie strategie so aanloklik geword het, en hoe dit wêreldwye stabiliteit ondermyn. As jy wil verstaan hoe Sirië, Oekraïne, Jemen – en veral Iran en Hezbollah – deel vorm van ’n nuwe era van indirekte konflik, dan is hierdie ontleding onmisbaar.

Abstract: Dr Riaan Eksteen

On 24 June 2026, I participated in the International Online Scientific Conference discussing “PROXY WARFARE – Proxy Wars in the Contemporary Security Environment,” which was held online via Microsoft Teams, Warsaw. My presentation was entitled “The Return of Indirect Conflict: Strategy, Risks, and Accountability”.

Here is a summary of that presentation.

Proxy conflicts are a critical aspect of the contemporary security landscape, since they enable states and non-state actors to achieve strategic objectives indirectly, frequently underneath the threshold of overt interstate conflict. A proxy war is a conflict in which a foreign entity aids a local state or non-state combatant to influence the outcome without direct belligerent involvement. The key concern inherent in this definition is the employment of a proxy force to further the sponsor’s goals.

Proxy conflicts feature three participants: the sponsor, the proxy, and the target or adversary. This triangle illustrates that proxy wars are not only local disputes but complex confrontations where local grievances and international geopolitical rivalries converge.

Proxy conflicts have evolved significantly since the Cold War, becoming crucial in today’s multipolar world. Modern proxy warfare reflects indirect rivalries among major and regional powers seeking influence while minimising the risks and costs of direct confrontation. This form of warfare operates within a “grey-zone” context, allowing states to use proxies for deniability, reduced political costs, and controlled escalation, making it attractive in an era where direct conflict poses substantial dangers.

The motivations for employing proxies include minimising military and political costs, maintaining plausible deniability, extending influence without formal occupation, undermining adversaries through instability, and exploiting local divisions. Proxy conflicts typically arise where domestic instability, international competition, and armed local allies converge, often seen in civil wars and regional security vacuums.

Contemporary proxy warfare encompasses a range of strategies beyond traditional military support, including cyber operations, private military firms, and information warfare, blurring the lines between peace and war. This complexity complicates conflict resolution through conventional diplomacy. Case studies such as Syria and Ukraine illustrate how localised conflicts intertwine with broader geopolitical rivalries, highlighting the divergence of modern proxy wars from Cold War precedents while preserving the essence of indirect rivalry. Then there is also Iran, together with Hezbollah in Lebanon. I will address this later.

Security policy, international law, and geopolitical dynamics are all significantly impacted by proxy warfare. It hides the legal definition of armed conflict, increases civilian fatalities, prolongs bloodshed, and complicates responsibility. Experts observe that the strict laws governing battle sometimes make it difficult to enforce them effectively, thereby encouraging the emergence of proxy wars. The main reason countries use proxies is to cut costs, enabling them to pursue geopolitical goals without deploying sizable conventional armies or facing internal opposition. Additionally, this tactic reduces legal liability and prevents formal disagreement by making it impossible to identify sponsors through ambiguous interaction.

Iran’s assistance for Hezbollah in Lebanon is an example of how proxies expand strategic reach into unstable or disputed areas. The idea of grey-zone rivalry, in which governments use military assistance, covert operations, and cyber activities to blur the boundaries between peace and conflict, is consistent with contemporary proxy warfare. This modern strategy aims to influence regional dynamics and weaken competitors without resorting to direct combat. Classifying and resolving conflicts has become more difficult due to the evolving nature of proxy warfare, which now involves a wide range of parties, including governments, militias, commercial military companies, and transnational networks. The large number of participants blurs the distinction between local goals and global objectives.

Recent conflicts illustrate the complex dynamics of proxy warfare, where local civil strife becomes a battleground for external actors. Syria exemplifies this, showcasing how internal fragmentation can attract various international supporters backing different factions. Ukraine further highlights the intricacies of support dynamics and the risks of escalation, emphasising the internationalisation of conflict and its implications for European security. Yemen, on the other hand, reveals how external assistance can worsen an already dire humanitarian situation, demonstrating the devastating effects of regional proxy dynamics.

Iran’s use of proxy militias, particularly in Lebanon with Hezbollah, represents a unique strategy for asserting regional and global influence. Over the years, Iran has developed a sophisticated network of militias across the Middle East, equipping them with advanced weaponry. This strategy not only enhances Iran’s security but also provides it with strategic depth and regional leverage. By maintaining plausible deniability, Iran can exert significant influence while avoiding direct accountability for its actions, thereby fostering instability in the region.

The Iranian leadership believes it can escalate its proxy warfare against Israel whenever necessary, particularly in response to Israeli actions against Hezbollah. This approach reflects a strategy of conditional de-escalation, where Iran links diplomatic overtures to the outcomes of conflicts managed by its proxies. Such a strategy embodies the essence of modern proxy warfare, characterised by negotiated influence, strategic ambiguity, and the threat of escalation.

In this context, Iran views the conflict in Lebanon as part of a broader indirect confrontation with Israel, utilising Hezbollah to shape outcomes while minimising the risk of direct conflict. The patron in proxy warfare often seeks to leverage its partner’s military engagement to negotiate power. Iran’s strategy allows it to avoid the costs associated with open warfare while still applying pressure on Israel through Hezbollah’s actions. Moreover, Tehran can use the proxy conflict as a bargaining chip in negotiations with the United States, seeking to link a ceasefire with broader diplomatic agreements.

This interplay between proxy warfare and diplomacy complicates accountability, as responsibility is often shared among the patron, the proxy, and the local context. While Iran may present itself as advocating for de-escalation, critics argue that it is merely externalising risks and maintaining pressure on adversaries through non-state actors. Thus, proxy warfare not only serves military objectives but also becomes a tool for negotiation and influence, blurring the lines between battlefield actions and diplomatic maneuvers.

Proxy warfare has emerged as a significant feature of contemporary conflict, blurring the lines between combat and diplomacy. In this context, proxies serve not only as military instruments but also as tools for communication, escalation, and negotiation for the sponsoring state. This duality allows for indirect combat to create leverage while simultaneously posing the risk of escalating into direct warfare if control over the proxy weakens. The complexity of accountability in proxy warfare arises from the shared culpability among the patron state, the proxy, and the local context, complicating the attribution of responsibility for actions taken during conflicts.

Iran exemplifies this dynamic, presenting itself as a proponent of de-escalation. The initiation of proxy battles is often simpler than their management, as local actors may have their own agendas that diverge from those of their sponsors. This principal-agent dilemma can lead to unintended consequences, such as increased violence or actions that may embarrass the sponsor. While proxy warfare can provide short-term advantages, it often leads to long-term instability, as sponsors use proxies to influence political structures, protect allied regimes, and destabilise adversaries without direct military involvement.

From an international law perspective, proxy warfare raises intricate issues regarding attribution, control, and conflict classification. A key challenge is determining when a sponsor’s involvement is sufficient to internationalise a conflict or to hold the state accountable for the proxy’s actions. Current legal frameworks are seen as inadequate, allowing states to evade full accountability for illegal actions conducted through proxies. The International Committee of the Red Cross emphasises that legal categorisations should be based on established criteria rather than political labels, as the relevant laws depend on the factual circumstances of armed conflict.

The humanitarian consequences of proxy conflicts are profound, often prolonging wars by providing external support that diminishes incentives for compromise. This external assistance can empower local actors, leading to increased suffering for civilians and complicating the prospects for a lasting resolution. The fragmentation of accountability among local combatants, sponsors, and international support networks further exacerbates the humanitarian impact, creating a disconnect between strategic actions and legal responsibilities.

Proxy conflicts are now integral to the global security landscape, serving as a favoured means of indirect competition among major powers, including the United States, Russia, and China, as well as regional powers such as Iran and Saudi Arabia. These actors engage in proxy warfare to exert influence, maintain deniability, and minimise costs while avoiding the risks of direct conflict. Research indicates that major powers are the primary foreign funders of proxy conflicts, supporting local groups in regions such as Ukraine, Yemen, and Syria to further their strategic objectives.

Current analyses highlight the regional dynamics of proxy warfare, with Iran supporting militant factions in various Middle Eastern countries and Saudi Arabia backing rival groups. This pattern illustrates how states and non-state actors alike engage in proxy relationships to achieve their goals. The advantages of proxy warfare are often similar across different participants, allowing sponsors to pursue ambitious objectives with reduced troop deployments and lower domestic costs.

However, proxy conflicts can escalate beyond their initial aims, often due to sponsors’ reluctance to accept defeat. The entanglement of sponsors with their proxies can make withdrawal costly, as seen in Iran’s extensive proxy network, which is integral to its deterrence strategy against adversaries like Israel and the United States. The fear of losing influence or facing reprisals can trap sponsors in a cycle of escalating support.

Importantly, proxy warfare encompasses more than just military operations; non-military objectives are increasingly significant in the current security landscape. This multifaceted approach highlights the complexity of modern conflicts, in which the interplay between military and non-military strategies shapes the outcomes of proxy engagements. As the dynamics of proxy warfare evolve, understanding these complexities becomes crucial for addressing the challenges they pose to international stability and humanitarian welfare.

States like Russia and China increasingly employ non-military proxy actions to manipulate political landscapes in targeted nations. These actions include political interference through agents of influence and media manipulation to sway elections and public opinion. Cyber proxies, defined as non-state actors that conduct cyber operations for client states, engage in espionage, thereby complicating diplomatic relations. Information operations, including disinformation campaigns, aim to undermine democratic legitimacy and exacerbate societal divides, as seen in Russia’s actions during the Ukraine conflict. Economic coercion is another tactic that uses financial mechanisms to create dependence or penalise governments for political decisions, exemplified by China’s use of state-owned enterprises in its foreign policy. Additionally, infiltrating civil society organisations and NGOs allows states to subtly influence domestic discourse and decision-making without resorting to military force. Collectively, these strategies highlight a sophisticated approach to exerting influence and achieving geopolitical objectives.

Non-military proxies are appealing to sponsors because they offer greater deniability than armed proxies. In cyberspace and financial networks, attribution is complex, and legal accountability is often lacking. This allows actions to remain below the threshold for formal military responses, potentially causing significant strategic consequences. A 2026 Chatham House study highlights how elevated standards for linking non-state actions to states enable Russia to evade accountability. Proxy activity spans a continuum from armed militias to cyber proxies and political influence agents.

THE RETURN OF INDIRECT CONFLICT: STRATEGY, RISKS, AND ACCOUNTABILITY

Dr Riaan Eksteen

[06:44, 10/07/2026] Riaan Eksteen: On 24 June 2026, I participated in the International Online Scientific Conference discussing “PROXY WARFARE – Proxy Wars in the Contemporary Security Environment,” which was held online via Microsoft Teams, Warsaw. My presentation was entitled “The Return of Indirect Conflict: Strategy, Risks, and Accountability”.

Afterward, I converted the presentation into a full article which has now been published by The Research Institute for European and American Studies (RIEAS) in Athens.

The following is its full text.

https://rieas.gr/researchareas/editorial/5096-the-return-of-indirect-conflict-strategy-risks-and-accountability