Abstract: In Nongqai Vol.17 No 4A, Strategic Security Analyst Dr Joan Swart examines how new warfare technologies are deployed in the current US-Iran, and Israel-Libanon conflict.
Dr Joan Swart
Key Words: Dr Joan Swart, Nongqai 2026, End of Traditional Military Advantage, Conflict Analysis, New Warfare Technologies, Accurate Force Deployment at Scale.
Precision at Scale and the End of Traditional Military Advantage
Recent conflicts have not merely introduced new technologies into warfare—they have exposed a structural shift in how military power is generated and applied. The wars in Ukraine and the Middle East demonstrate that the defining feature of contemporary conflict is no longer technological sophistication alone, but the ability to deploy accurate force at scale and at low cost.
What is emerging is a model of warfare in which relatively inexpensive systems—first-person view (FPV) drones, loitering munitions, and AI-assisted targeting tools—are producing battlefield effects once associated with far more complex and costly platforms. In Ukraine, large volumes of low-cost drones now account for a significant share of battlefield attrition. In the Middle East, missile and drone exchanges have revealed stark asymmetries between the cost of attack and the cost of defence.
This is not simply a technological evolution. It is a shift in the underlying economics of warfare.
From Industrial Mass to Precision at Scale
For most of the twentieth century, military advantage rested on the ability to combine industrial production with increasingly sophisticated platforms. Mass and precision were difficult to achieve simultaneously: large-scale forces were often less accurate, while highly precise systems were expensive and limited in number. That trade-off is eroding.
Advances in artificial intelligence, autonomy, and commercial manufacturing have enabled what some analysts describe as “precise mass”—the ability to deliver accurate effects at scale using relatively low-cost systems. Precision guidance is now widely accessible, commercial drone production has lowered barriers to entry, and AI-enabled systems are increasingly capable of operating in contested environments where communications are degraded or denied.
Electronic warfare has accelerated this shift. As jamming disrupts remotely piloted systems, both state and non-state actors are moving toward greater autonomy, reducing reliance on vulnerable data links. The result is not only more resilient systems, but also a further reduction in operational costs.
The implication is clear: the relationship between cost, scale, and effectiveness is being redefined.
Structural Exposure of Traditional Military Models
This transformation creates a structural challenge for conventional military models, particularly those built around high-cost, low-volume platforms.
Modern air forces, armoured formations, and naval assets remain highly capable, but they are increasingly exposed to saturation by large numbers of inexpensive systems. The cost asymmetry is difficult to reconcile. A missile interceptor that costs orders of magnitude more than the incoming threat is sustainable in limited engagements, but not necessarily over time or at scale.
More importantly, traditional procurement cycles and doctrinal frameworks are poorly suited to environments characterised by rapid iteration and adaptation. Many militaries still operate on doctrines that assume stable operating conditions, platform-centric warfare, and relatively predictable cycles of engagement. In Ukraine, however, frontline units have had to modify drone designs, frequencies, and targeting methods within days in response to adversary countermeasures. This kind of continuous adaptation sits uneasily with doctrines built around planning cycles, standardised systems, and controlled escalation. Systems designed over decades struggle to compete with technologies that can be modified, produced, and deployed in months—or even weeks.
This is not an argument that traditional capabilities are obsolete. Rather, it suggests that their relative advantage is diminishing in contexts where adaptability, redundancy, and volume matter more than singular platform superiority.
Africa and the Inversion of Capability
For African security environments, this shift has particularly significant implications.
Many African states face constraints in defence spending, industrial capacity, and technological development. Under previous models of warfare, these constraints translated directly into limited military capability. However, the emergence of precision at scale alters this equation.
Low-cost, commercially derived technologies reduce barriers to entry. More importantly, they align with operational environments already characterised by decentralisation, fluid authority structures, and hybrid actors. In several African contexts, non-state groups and irregular forces have demonstrated an ability to adapt quickly to new technologies, often outpacing state institutions constrained by bureaucracy and procurement rigidity.
This creates an inversion of capability. Military effectiveness is no longer determined primarily by the ability to acquire advanced platforms, but by the ability to integrate, adapt, and sustain systems under conditions of constraint.
For African states, this presents both opportunity and risk. It enables the development of more cost-effective defence strategies, but it also accelerates the diffusion of military capability to non-state actors, complicating already fragile security environments.
Strategic Consequences in a Multipolar System
The broader strategic implications extend beyond individual conflicts or regions.
First, deterrence dynamics are shifting. The ability of weaker actors to impose costs using low-cost systems complicates traditional assumptions about escalation and dominance. Even limited actors can now threaten high-value assets, increasing uncertainty and raising the potential costs of intervention.
Second, the monopoly of violence traditionally associated with the state is further eroded. As access to effective military technologies expands, the distinction between state and non-state capability becomes less pronounced, particularly in environments where governance is contested.
Third, international regulatory frameworks are likely to lag behind operational realities. Third, international regulatory frameworks are likely to lag behind operational realities. Artificial intelligence, as a general-purpose technology, is difficult to constrain through traditional arms control mechanisms. Efforts to regulate its military use will face the same challenges seen in other widely diffused technologies: strong incentives for adoption, rapid innovation cycles, and limited enforceability. For example, commercially available AI tools used for image recognition can be adapted for military targeting, while navigation algorithms developed for civilian drones can be repurposed for autonomous strike systems. In both cases, the underlying technologies are widely accessible, making meaningful restriction difficult.
Finally, military strategy itself must adapt. Success in this environment depends less on platform dominance and more on systems integration, resilience, and the capacity for continuous adaptation. The emphasis shifts from owning the most advanced systems to effectively employing available ones under dynamic conditions.
Closing Observations
The wars in Ukraine and the Middle East are not isolated case studies. They are early indicators of a broader transformation in the character of warfare.
The central shift is not technological in isolation, but structural: the collapse of the cost and complexity barriers that once defined military advantage. Precision is no longer scarce, and scale is no longer prohibitively expensive.
For African states, the implications are immediate. The question is no longer whether these dynamics will shape the continent’s security environment, but how they will be navigated under conditions of constraint, institutional variation, and external pressure.
For military planners more broadly, the challenge is more fundamental. The assumptions that have underpinned military advantage for decades are no longer stable.
The question is not whether militaries will adapt, but whether they can do so before those assumptions become liabilities.
Dr Joan Swart
NONGQAI’S National Security Correspondent Dr Joan Swart is a forensic psychologist and security analyst, with an MBA and an MA in Military Studies. Her work focuses on African security, geopolitics, state fragility, substate dynamics, and the intersection between governance, legitimacy, and coercive power. She is the author of several books and regularly publishes long-form analysis and opinion pieces on security and governance issues. Her writing has appeared in outlets including DefenceWeb, Maroela Media, Netwerk24, RSG, Visegrad, and other policy and public-affairs platforms. Her work bridges academic research, policy analysis, and applied strategic assessment, and she is currently completing a second PhD at the University of Stellenbosch Military Academy.
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