Abstract: In Nongqai Vol.17 No 4, Strategic Security Analyst Dr Joan Swart examines ‘Strategic Feedback Loops’: Why States Respond Differently—and Persist—in the Same Reality
Dr Joan Swart
Key Words: Dr Joan Swart, Nongqai 2026, Conflict Analysis, New Warfare Technologies, Accurate Force Deployment at Scale, Strategic Security Feedback Loops
Strategic Feedback Loops: Why States Respond Differently—and Persist—in the Same Reality
Why do states facing the same strategic environment make different choices?
At first glance, this appears puzzling. Decision-makers have access to broadly similar information: intelligence assessments, open-source reporting, and observable battlefield dynamics. Yet their responses often diverge sharply. In some cases, actors confronted with similar pressures—technological shifts, security threats, or geopolitical constraints—pursue entirely different strategies. Others persist with existing approaches even as conditions change.
This is not simply a matter of capability. It is a matter of interpretation.
Strategy is often presented as a rational response to objective conditions. In practice, it is shaped by how those conditions are understood. Decision-makers do not respond directly to reality. They respond to a filtered version of it, shaped by historical experience, institutional culture, and underlying assumptions about risk, time, and control. These mental models influence what is perceived as a threat, what is considered an opportunity, and which options appear viable or desirable.
As a result, the same set of facts can produce very different strategic choices.
A state with a history of technological dominance may interpret emerging low-cost threats as manageable disruptions, while another—accustomed to operating under constraint—may see them as an opportunity to rebalance the strategic environment. Similarly, approaches to escalation, deterrence, and adaptation are often less about objective conditions than about how those conditions are framed internally.
‘Strategy is not simply a calculation. It is an interpretation’
These differences in interpretation are not static. They are reinforced over time through feedback loops that shape how information is received, processed, and acted upon. A decision leads to action. That action is then interpreted—by domestic audiences, institutional actors, and external observers—in ways that often reinforce the assumptions underlying the original decision. These interpretations feed back into the decision-making environment, strengthening confidence in existing models and narrowing the space for reassessment.
This dynamic helps explain why states sometimes persist with strategies even when evidence suggests they are underperforming. Setbacks may be reframed as temporary, partial, or indicative of the need for greater effort rather than strategic adjustment. External commentary that aligns with this framing, whether political, media, or analytical, can further reinforce it.
‘Strategy becomes self-reinforcing’
This dynamic echoes the well-known OODA loop—observe, orient, decide, act—developed as a model of decision-making in competitive environments. In principle, advantage lies in the ability to cycle through this process more rapidly and accurately than an opponent. In practice, however, the “observe” and “orient” phases are shaped by the same cognitive, institutional, and narrative pressures that structure interpretation. Where these pressures reinforce existing assumptions, the loop may stabilise a particular understanding of reality rather than enable adaptation. Speed alone does not guarantee advantage if the orientation is flawed.
These feedback loops are not purely informational. They are also shaped by underlying cognitive and social dynamics. In uncertain and high-stakes environments, individuals and institutions exhibit a strong preference for coherence. Narratives that align with existing assumptions, identities, and expectations are more likely to be accepted and sustained. Contradictory information, by contrast, may be discounted, reinterpreted, or deprioritised.
This is not a matter of irrationality, but of stability. Decision-making systems, whether states, militaries, or political institutions, require internal coherence to function. Admitting error or uncertainty can carry institutional and political costs, while maintaining a consistent narrative can preserve legitimacy and cohesion. Systems tend toward agreement not because agreement is always correct, but because it is easier to sustain.
These pressures are not only cognitive but also institutional and material. Military organisations and defence ecosystems are embedded within broader political and economic structures, including procurement systems, industrial partnerships, and employment networks. Over time, these relationships can create incentives to sustain existing capability models and strategic assumptions, particularly where significant resources, expertise, and institutional identity are tied to them even as their relative effectiveness is increasingly questioned. This does not imply deliberate distortion, but it does mean that adaptation is not only a matter of recognising change, but also of navigating the costs of departing from established systems.
These interacting pressures—cognitive, institutional, and material—shape not only internal decision-making, but also the narratives through which events are interpreted externally. Over time, they give rise to stable interpretive frames that can persist even as underlying conditions change. In the case of military coups, for example, external actors often respond through a fixed interpretive lens that emphasises illegitimacy and democratic rupture. While normatively understandable, this framing can obscure the internal dynamics that produced the coup, including governance failures, security pressures, or shifting elite alignments. When policy responses are shaped primarily by the initial narrative, rather than evolving realities on the ground, engagement strategies can become disconnected from the actual drivers of stability or instability.
A similar pattern can emerge in the way states frame adversaries. Once a regime is categorised within a particular narrative, whether as irrational, aggressive, or inherently destabilising, subsequent actions are often interpreted through that lens. This does not mean the behaviour in question is unjustified or misunderstood, but it does mean that the range of possible interpretations narrows. Over time, policy responses may become anchored in earlier assumptions, even as conditions evolve.
In this way, strategic behaviour and its interpretation are co-produced. Decision-makers act based on their understanding of reality, while observers—media, analysts, and external actors—construct narratives that can reinforce or challenge that understanding. Where those narratives align, they can create powerful feedback loops that sustain particular strategic paths. Where they diverge, they can generate friction, misperception, or policy incoherence.
For Africa, these dynamics carry particular significance. African security environments are often interpreted through external analytical frameworks that emphasise instability, weakness, or institutional failure. While these elements may be present, such interpretations can obscure the adaptive strategies that emerge under conditions of constraint.
In many cases, what appears externally as inconsistency or fragility may reflect deliberate forms of risk management, hedging, or decentralised control. When external actors misinterpret these dynamics, their responses, whether in the form of policy, partnership, or intervention, may be misaligned with on-the-ground realities. These misinterpretations can then feed back into the system, reinforcing flawed assumptions and complicating efforts to achieve stability.
Understanding African strategic behaviour therefore requires more than observing outcomes. It requires recognising the interpretive frameworks through which those outcomes are produced and understood.
A New and Increasingly Multipolar World
In an increasingly multipolar world, these dynamics become more consequential. As power diffuses and the international system becomes more contested, interactions between actors with different strategic cultures and interpretive models increase. This raises the risk of miscalculation, not only because of conflicting interests, but because of differing understandings of the same situation.
Partnerships may falter when actors interpret commitments, risks, or intentions differently. Deterrence may become less predictable when signals are read through incompatible frameworks. Efforts at coordination may be undermined by divergent assumptions about what constitutes success or failure.
At the same time, the feedback loops that sustain strategic persistence can make adaptation slower and more difficult, even as the external environment changes rapidly. For strategists and policymakers, the implication is not that these dynamics can be eliminated, but that they must be actively managed. This requires a degree of discipline that goes beyond access to information. It requires the ability to separate observation from interpretation, to recognise when assumptions are being reinforced rather than tested, and to create space—formally or informally—for perspectives that challenge prevailing views.
In practice, this means treating dominant narratives as provisional rather than fixed, and paying particular attention to evidence that contradicts them. Without such mechanisms, the natural tendency of decision-making systems is toward coherence rather than accuracy, and toward persistence rather than adaptation.
The challenge in strategy is not only to understand the environment, but to understand how that environment is interpreted—and how those interpretations are reinforced over time.
States do not respond to a single, shared reality. They respond to realities shaped by history, culture, institutional logic, and the narratives that surround them. These realities are not fixed. They are continuously constructed and sustained through interaction between decision-makers, observers, and broader audiences.
The question is not only whether actors can adapt to changing conditions, but whether they can recognise when the realities they are acting upon are, in part, of their own making.
Dr Joan Swart
NONGQAI’S Strategic Security Analist Dr Joan Swart is a forensic psychologist with an MBA and an MA in Military Studies. Her work focuses on African security, geopolitics, state fragility, substate dynamics, and the intersection between governance, legitimacy, and coercive power. She is the author of several books and regularly publishes long-form analysis and opinion pieces on security and governance issues. Her writing has appeared in outlets including DefenceWeb, Maroela Media, Netwerk24, RSG, Visegrad, and other policy and public-affairs platforms. Her work bridges academic research, policy analysis, and applied strategic assessment, and she is currently completing a second PhD at the University of Stellenbosch Military Academy.
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