Abstract: In Nongqai Vol.17 No 4, Strategic Security Analyst Dr Joan Swart examines how and why STARLINK has become a buzz word not only in the age of Strategic Infrastructe and Interconnectivity, but also a bilateral political point of contention between South Africa and the United States.
Dr Joan Swart
Key Words: Dr Joan Swart, Nongqai April 2026, STARLINK, Strategic Infrastructure, Strategic Interconnectivity.
STARLINK and Sovereignty: Connectivity in the Age of Strategic Infrastructue
Satellite-based internet systems such as Starlink are often presented as a technological solution to a longstanding problem: how to extend reliable connectivity to remote and underserved areas. In much of Africa, where infrastructure gaps remain significant, the appeal is clear. Access to communication networks underpins economic activity, governance, education, and security. From this perspective, the expansion of satellite internet appears not only desirable, but necessary.
Since its introduction on the continent, Starlink has expanded rapidly, with services now available or licensed in a growing number of African states, including Nigeria, Kenya, Mozambique and Zambia. At the same time, several countries have delayed or restricted its entry through regulatory requirements or enforcement actions. This uneven adoption reflects not only administrative processes, but a deeper tension between access and control.
Operating beyond traditional territorial constraints
Yet this framing captures only part of the picture. What is emerging is not simply a new layer of connectivity, but a shift in the relationship between communication infrastructure and state authority. Systems such as Starlink operate beyond traditional territorial constraints. They are privately owned, globally deployed, and technically capable of providing access independent of national telecommunications networks. In doing so, they introduce a form of connectivity that is not fully mediated by the state.
This represents a structural change in the relationship between communication infrastructure and state authority. Historically, control over communication networks has been closely tied to sovereignty. States have regulated, licensed, and, where necessary, restricted access to infrastructure within their borders. This control has served multiple functions: enabling economic coordination, supporting governance, and maintaining authority over the flow of information.
Reducing the state’s exclusivity and operatonal boundries
Satellite-based systems alter this dynamic. They do not remove the state from the equation, but they reduce its exclusivity as a gatekeeper. Where access can be established without reliance on national infrastructure, the state’s ability to regulate and, if necessary, restrict communication becomes more limited.
This tension is not purely institutional—it is also philosophical. Advocates of decentralised systems argue that access to communication should not be subject to state control, particularly where such control may be used to restrict information. From this perspective, technologies that bypass central authority enhance individual liberty. Yet from a state perspective, the ability to regulate communication remains a core function of sovereignty, particularly where national security is concerned. The result is a persistent tension between openness and control that cannot be resolved through technology alone.
Recent conflicts illustrate both sides of this dynamic. In Iran, satellite-based connectivity has enabled communication during periods of state-imposed restriction, but has also been treated as a security threat subject to jamming and enforcement. In Ukraine, reliance on external satellite networks has demonstrated both resilience and vulnerability, as access to communication infrastructure becomes contingent on decisions made outside the state itself.
These dynamics are not theoretical in the African context. Evidence from the Sahel and Sudan indicates that satellite-based connectivity is already being utilised by armed groups. Jihadist organisations linked to Al-Qaeda and Islamic State have acquired Starlink terminals through illicit supply chains, using them to coordinate operations and communicate in areas beyond the reach of conventional infrastructure. In Sudan, paramilitary forces have similarly relied on smuggled devices to maintain communication during periods of network disruption. These developments illustrate that such systems are not only enabling access, but are already shaping the operational environment.
For African states, this creates both opportunity and risk. The benefits of expanded connectivity are substantial. In remote regions, satellite internet may provide access where terrestrial infrastructure is economically or logistically unviable. It can support service delivery, enable economic participation, and expand access to education through digital learning platforms. In rural areas of countries such as South Africa, where connectivity gaps persist, such systems could significantly enhance access to information and services.
At the same time, the introduction of external infrastructure into national information environments introduces new considerations. Where communication networks are not fully under national control, the boundaries of sovereignty become less clearly defined. This does not imply a loss of sovereignty, but a reconfiguration of how it is exercised.
Security implications follow. Communication systems that are accessible, resilient, and difficult to restrict may be used by a wide range of actors, including those operating outside formal state structures. In remote farming areas, for example, satellite connectivity could enable real-time monitoring, coordination, and response, improving local security. Yet similar capabilities could also be utilised by criminal or insurgent networks operating across large geographic areas.
How do states engage?
The question is therefore not whether systems such as Starlink should be adopted or rejected. That framing is too narrow. The more relevant question is how states engage with a form of infrastructure that expands access while complicating control.
In principle, states can regulate such systems through licensing, compliance requirements, and enforcement mechanisms. In practice, however, the effectiveness of these measures is increasingly uncertain. Satellite-based connectivity is inherently difficult to contain, and instances of unauthorised use have already been observed in countries where formal approval has not been granted. Control, in this context, becomes partial rather than absolute.
The challenge is not to choose between control and access, but to manage the balance between them. This requires a shift from viewing connectivity purely as a technical issue to recognising it as a strategic domain. States will need to develop regulatory frameworks that enable access while maintaining oversight, invest in their own technological capabilities, and establish clear conditions under which external infrastructure can operate. At the same time, they must adapt to an environment in which full control over information flows is no longer assured.
For South Africa, the question is not whether such systems will become relevant—they already are—but how they will be integrated into an existing regulatory and security framework in a way that reflects both national priorities and evolving technological realities.
The expansion of satellite-based connectivity does not eliminate the role of the state, but it does redefine it. Authority over communication is no longer exercised solely through control of infrastructure, but through the ability to shape, regulate, and adapt to systems that extend beyond national boundaries.
The question is not whether this shift can be prevented. It is whether it can be managed in a way that preserves both security and opportunity.
NONGQAI’S Strategic Security Analist Dr Joan Swart is a forensic psychologist with an MBA and an MA in Military Studies. Her work focuses on African security, geopolitics, state fragility, substate dynamics, and the intersection between governance, legitimacy, and coercive power. She is the author of several books and regularly publishes long-form analysis and opinion pieces on security and governance issues. Her writing has appeared in outlets including DefenceWeb, Maroela Media, Netwerk24, RSG, Visegrad, and other policy and public-affairs platforms. Her work bridges academic research, policy analysis, and applied strategic assessment, and she is currently completing a second PhD at the University of Stellenbosch Military Academy.
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