Defence Stragery
Nongqai – Helmoed Römer Heitman – January 2026
Defence strategy is the tool set that makes it possible for the Defence Force to execute defence policy, which will have defined the responsibilities and tasks of the Defence Force. Those can be set out as mission sets, from which can be developed the required capability sets.
The basic group of mission sets includes:
- Homeland Security:
- Border, Air Space and Maritime Zones Protection.
- Protection of Vital Infrastructure.
- Counter-Terrorist Capability.
- Protection of External Vital Interests, in South Africa’s case including the Cahora Bassa hydro-electric plant, Mozambique’s gas fields and Maputo port, and the Mozambique Channel, which is a key shipping route including for imported oil.
- Deterrence and Defence.
- Constabulary Operations, such as counter-piracy operations in African waters.
Intervention Operations, for instance in the case of aggression against a neighbour and when instability in a neighbouring country threatens to spill over the border.
In addition, the Defence Force may be designated to have responsibility for some non-military missions, which in South Africa’s case include:
- Search and Rescue Operations in the Southern African Search and Rescue Region.
- Hydrographic and perhaps oceanographic survey.
Finally, there might of course also be alliance commitments and commitments undertaken in respect of the African Union or the United Nations.
Deterrence and Defence
The least likely eventuality is a conventional attack. But that is also the only one that holds real danger of a catastrophic outcome if it cannot be deterred or defeated. As such, it must be the primary mission of the Defence Force, all else falling in line behind it, to be executed mainly as collateral capabilities.
Given the sheer cost and waste of war, the optimal strategy must be to deter aggression rather than defend against it.
There are those who believe South Africa is too far from anywhere to ever face aggression on a large scale. They forget that major powers can deploy their own or proxy forces. Consider the Soviet deployment of Cuban forces to Angola in 1975 and to Ethiopia in 1977. Similarly, it is worth keeping in mind the British operation to recapture the Falklands in 1982, the mainly US operation to evict Iraq from Kuwait in 1991, the NATO intervention in the Balkans in 1992 in the wake of the break-up of Yugoslavia, the mainly US operations in Afghanistan after 2001 and the invasion of Iraq in 2003. All distant operations. It is also salutary to remember that three much smaller countries – Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi – very successfully invaded Zaire and later the DRC.
Consider the Unlikely
The bottom line here is that defence strategy must consider the unlikely, as the unlikely has an unfortunate habit of taking place. Even what is considered impossible often proves to actually be possible – remember the German attacks through the Ardennes in 1940 and 1944.
Deterrence along the lines of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) is clearly not relevant in the case of South Africa. But there are other possible strategies to deter aggression, for instance:
- Poison Pill: Based on an extended post invasion guerrilla war, potentially costing more than the expected benefit of the aggression[1]. Perhaps better termed dissuasion rather than deterrence, as it does not hold threat of destruction or at least massive losses, as do the other forms.
- Hedgehog: Based on conducting defensive operations long enough for allies or another power that sees a threat to its position to intervene[2].
- Detonator: Based on an alliance or strategic situatino that would automatically trigger a military response by another power or powers against the aggressor[3].
None of these would really work for South Africa.
What could work is a strategy to dissuade aggression by means of conventional capability that would render the cost out of reasonable proportion to any expected benefit.
Deterrent Triad
One approach for South Africa might be a deterrent triad comprising threshold, denial of entry and denial of maneuver elements.
Threshold: The threshold element of the triad would be to maintain conventional forces at a level that forces an aggressor to commit substantial forces with the logistic support to sustain an extended campaign. That would the direct cost and the opportunity cost of the aggression and would also present risk of some other power deciding to intervene.
Denial of Entry: Any major aggression would require forces to deploy into the region by sea. That presents the possibility of imposing potentially unacceptable entry costs by submarine action (mining or direct attack) and special forces actions against port facilities.
Denial of Maneuver: Any major force attacking South Africa would be faced with having to sustain force elements over long distances by road over a relatively thin road network. That presents the possibility of interdiction by air attack on logistic convoys, ambushes by special forces and focused sabotage (e.g. bridges) by special forces, crippling the ability to manoeuver to any good effect.
French Emperor Napoleon Bonaparte [1768-1821]: Master Military Strategist, or Failed Defence Strategy Practitioner?
The forces required to implement this approach would also present an aggressor with risk of a pre-emptive strike to disrupt the build-up of forces and would also enable the Defence Force to deal with lesser threats, for instance to external vital interests, and to assist neighbours facing aggression.
- Similar to Vietnam’s defence against the Chinese invasion in 1979. ↑
- That was the core of Austria’s defence strategy during the Cold War, and was de facto the strategy that Ukraine implemented to counter the Russian invasion of 2022. ↑
- Similar to one version of French nuclear deterrence theory. ↑
Helmoed Romer Heitman
- The Nongqai National Security Correspondent and Columnist Helmoed Römer Heitman has written and lectured on defence since 1978. He served in the SA Army reserve from 1970 to 1996, finally at the Long-Term Planning Division at Defence Headquarters. He has consulted to the Ministry of Defence, the Defence Force, political parties and defence industry companies, worked with the non-statutory forces and political parties in 1991/94 and during the 1995/96 Defence White Paper drafting and served on a work group of the 1997/98 Defence Review. He participated in Army Vision 2020 and doctrine development for the Rooivalk attack helicopter in 2005/06, drew up an airlift study for the Ministry of Defence in 2009, served on the Defence Review Committee in 2011/13, worked on through-life capability management in 2015/17, helped edit the Defence Acquisition Handbook and drafted the defence industry strategy in 2017, an intervention plan in 2019 and parts of the Aerospace and Defence Industry Master Plan in 2020.