Foreign Policy
Helmoed Römer Heitman – December 2025
Abstract: Helmoed Romer Heitman, National Security in South Africa, SA Foreign Policy, SA Multilateralism, South Africa in Africa.
The South African government has three primary purposes: Protecting the country and its vital interests (defence), protecting individuals within the country (police, judiciary) and managing relations with other countries (foreign relations). One could add managing national infrastructure and facilitating economic activity. Unfortunately, our government has quite clearly failed in respect of the first two of the primary functions. Nor has it done well managing the national infrastructure or the economy.
That leaves foreign relations.
The focus of foreign policy should be countries that are key trading partners and investors and countries relevant to national security.
Instead, government is infatuated mostly with countries that are economically and strategically irrelevant to South Africa:
- Russia is a dying power with a crumbling economy of no economic or strategic relevance to South Africa and is seen as a threat by countries that are economically important to South Africa, among them most of Europe, our primary source of serious investment.
- Iran is a strange theocracy with a crumbling economy of no relevance to South Africa and is seen as a threat by other Gulf countries that are economically important to South Africa (oil) and is only strategically relevant as a threat to shipping in the Red Sea (via its Houthi clients) and as a potential threat to oil shipments through Hormuz.
- Cuba is simply irrelevant.
China is the one exception, a growing power and major trade partner, albeit one with which we have a strongly negative balance of trade, one of limited strategic relevance to South Africa, and one viewed as a threat by other trading partners, including BRICS partner India, a rising strategic power in the Indian Ocean region.
Meanwhile the government seems happy to alienate the United States and Western Europe, our most important trading partners and investors.
To put that in perspective, in 2024 South Africa had:
- A trade surplus of $ 2.14 billion with the United States and $ 2.67 billion with the ten biggest European trading partners; and
- A trade deficit of $ 14.50 billion with the original BRICS countries.
The issue is illustrated neatly by looking specifically at exports, which create and sustain jobs, taking 2024 figures as an example.
Exports to the original BRICS partners came to some $ 19.14 billion:
- China and Hong Kong $ 13.77 billion (almost only raw materials), India $ 4.75 billion, Brazil $ 319.98 million, Russia $ 299.45 million.
Exports to two other countries we seem to favour came to just some $ 23.76 million:
- Iran $ 19.62 million, Cuba $ 4.14 million.
Exports to countries not enamored of our foreign policy came to some $ 35.43 billion. Taking only those importing more than $ 1 billion annually from us:
- United States $ 8.21 billion, Germany $ 7.08 billion, UK $ 5.28 billion, Japan $ 4.88 billion, Japan $ 4.88 billion, Netherlands $ 4.28 billion, Belgium $ 3.03 billion, South Korea $ 1.65 billion, Australia $ 1.02 billion.
To the economics we should add that Europe has a real interest in Africa being stable (fewer illegal immigrants) and prosperous (exports) and sees South Africa as a strategic partner on the continent and on the sea route around the Cape as an alternative to the vulnerable Suez Canal.
Clearly, our foreign policy is not rational in either economic or strategic terms.
We are told, however, that our foreign policy is based on principles. Hence taking Israel to court for its actions in Gaza. Fine; it is possible to argue that Israel went too far in its reaction to Hamas terrorism. But where is our outrage at Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, its drone and missile strikes on cities and its treatment of people in occupied territory? When the General Assembly of the United Nations on 26 April 2023 adopted Resolution 77/284 that referred to “the aggression by the Russian Federation against Ukraine, and against Georgia prior to that”, Russia of course voted against it. Out BRICS partners Brazil, India and China voted for it, South Africa alone abstained. That suggests a lack of outrage.
It is also difficult to find even mild criticism of how Iran treats its women and others who may object to its internal policies, or criticism of the attacks on ships in the Red Sea by the Iranian supported Houthis. Or China’s occupation of islands and reefs inside the Exclusive Economic Zones of other countries.
So perhaps the principles that supposedly govern our foreign policy are a little flexible?
Flexible or not, our foreign policy does not support South Africa’s national interests and needs urgent revision to focus on those interests and particularly our economic interests. We would do well to heed Lord Palmerston’s 1848 view of foreign policy: “We have no eternal allies, and we have no perpetual enemies. Our interests are eternal and perpetual, and those interests it is our duty to follow.”
That revision should begin with thorough analysis of the economic and strategic interests, near, medium and long-term, of neighbours, regional actors, trading partners and major powers as perceived by their governments.
That analysis must be carried out by the diplomatic and intelligence services. Most importantly it must be a clear-eyed, cold, hard analysis. There is no room at all for sentiment or ideological fairy tales, past supposed friendships or past enmities, particularly in an era of realignment and renewed major power competition. It must be a clean sheet of paper process.
Properly carried out and constantly updated, that will enable us to identify where our interests may align with those of others or not, and to focus foreign policy to best effect economically and strategically, and to develop an intelligent national security policy and an effective defence policy and strategy.
National Security Correspondent, Nongqai.org
The Nongqai National Security Correspondent and Columnist Helmoed Römer Heitman has written and lectured on defence since 1978. He served in the SA Army reserve from 1970 to 1996, finally at the Long-Term Planning Division at Defence Headquarters. He has consulted to the Ministry of Defence, the Defence Force, political parties and defence industry companies, worked with the non-statutory forces and political parties in 1991/94 and during the 1995/96 Defence White Paper drafting and served on a work group of the 1997/98 Defence Review. He participated in Army Vision 2020 and doctrine development for the Rooivalk attack helicopter in 2005/06, drew up an airlift study for the Ministry of Defence in 2009, served on the Defence Review Committee in 2011/13, worked on through-life capability management in 2015/17, helped edit the Defence Acquisition Handbook and drafted the defence industry strategy in 2017, an intervention plan in 2019 and parts of the Aerospace and Defence Industry Master Plan in 2020. He has also briefed work sessions of the Security Cluster Directors General, the Chief of the Defence Force, the GOC Special Forces, the Standing Maritime Committee of the Inter-State Defence and Security Committee, the French Ministry of Defence and the German Army Combat Reconnaissance School. Helmoed Heitman holds economics and public administration degrees (University of Cape Town), an MA (War Studies; King’s College, University of London) and management diplomas (Stellenbosch University Graduate School of Business) and passed the junior staff course of the SA Army College.*