ISRAEL, GAZA, AND THE MORAL LANDSCAPE OF WAR – Peter M. Swanepoel

by | Oct 28, 2025 | Academicians, and Power - Peter M Swanepoel, INTERNATIONAL TERROR, Nongqai Books & Writers, Nongqai Columns, NONGQAI Publications, SKRYWERS & BOEKE | 0 comments

Peter M Swanepoel

Israel, Gaza and the Moral Landscape of War

Abstract: Peter M. Swanepoel, Gaza-Israel War, Hamas, Palestinian Authority, History of the Middle East, Israel, the Power Factor in International Relations.

A plain-spoken argument about aid, ethics, and why ‘less war’ likely requires removing Hamas first.

Peter M Swanepoel

This is not a slogan. It is a clear-eyed walk through aid, escalation, law, and the miserable arithmetic of a war that keeps resetting itself. I am sympathetic to Palestinian suffering and unapologetically firm about Israel’s right to exist and defend itself. If you are tired of tribal talking points, this is written for you.

TL;DR

  • Hamas sacralises death — glorifying ‘martyrdom,’ embedding among civilians, and impeding evacuations — so it functions less like a liberation movement and more like a death cult.
  • Hamas’s control of Gaza blocks any durable calm.
  • Israel’s responses are ugly because Hamas embeds in civilian areas — by design.
  • ‘Proportionality’ isn’t body-count math; it is (often subjective) legal balancing.
  • Media magnifies this war while deadlier Arab-on-Arab wars get less airtime.

A Note on the PA and the West Bank

This essay zeroes in on Gaza and Hamas; it does not wade into the Palestinian Authority (PA) and the West Bank, which is a whole different tangle. In Ramallah, the PA runs a patchwork of self-rule areas, cooperates (uneasily) with Israeli security, and wrestles with corruption charges and long-delayed elections. On top of that sit the Israeli settlements — expanding enclaves that are, to put it mildly, highly problematic and fuel daily friction. All of this deserves its own deep dive; covering it here would blow up the length of the piece and blur the focus. So, for now, consider the PA-West Bank file marked “important, but beyond this piece.”

Any path forward needs a credible post-Hamas authority. Over the past two decades, few global conflicts have drawn more emotion, confusion, and moral complexity than the war between Israel and Hamas. To truly understand what is happening — and how we should think about it — one must move beyond slogans and tribal allegiances and enter into a deeper, more rational, and ethically honest conversation. This challenge is made even more difficult by the overwhelming media bias that often frames Israel as the sole aggressor, while downplaying or rationalising the actions of its adversaries. Mainstream platforms frequently elevate voices that are hostile to Israel, creating a distorted narrative that obscures context, ignores nuance, and undermines balanced discourse. Case in point: On Oct. 17, 2023, an explosion at Gaza City’s al-Ahli Arab Hospital was immediately blamed on Israel by Hamas authorities and, within minutes, by many outlets and social accounts — sparking protests and global outrage. Within days, however, U.S. intelligence said with ‘high confidence’ the blast was caused by a misfired Palestinian rocket, and multiple visual analyses pointed the same way, with damage consistent with an explosion in the parking area rather than a direct Israeli strike. Even The New York Times later ran an editors’ note admitting its early coverage ‘relied too heavily on claims by Hamas’ and wasn’t clear about what could be verified. Yet the initial narrative raced ahead of the facts, and the corrections that followed rarely matched the reach of the first headlines.

To understand the current Israel–Gaza conflict, we must begin with a brief look at a basic timeline of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. The roots are deep, shaped by religion, extremism, nationalism, ideology, and trauma. This is by no means a comprehensive timeline, but just a quick look in.

  • Late 1800s–1947: The rise of Zionism (Jewish nationalism) emerged in Europe alongside growing Arab nationalism in the Middle East. As Jewish immigration to Ottoman and later British-controlled Palestine increased, tensions with local Arab populations grew. The emergence of Zionism was deeply shaped by centuries of well documented Jewish persecution across Europe and the Russian Empire. Jews faced forced conversions, social exclusion, and systemic antisemitism, culminating in pogroms, expulsions, attempted extermination, and scapegoating in both Eastern and Western Europe. Events like the Dreyfus Affair in France (1894) and the violent pogroms in Russia highlighted the vulnerability of Jews even in ostensibly liberal societies. In this context, Zionism developed not simply as a nationalist ideology, but as a survivalist response — the belief that Jews needed a homeland of their own where they could be safe, sovereign, and free from the cycles of marginalisation and violence that had haunted them for generations.
  • 1947: The newly formed UN proposed partition into Jewish and Arab states. Jewish leaders accepted; Arab states and local Arab leaders rejected. The plan passed by a two-thirds vote at a time when the UN carried greater moral authority than today. It allocated about 55% of the land to the Jewish state (roughly one-third of the population) and 45% to the Arab state — seen by many Arabs as a disproportionate grant to a minority.
  • 1948: Upon Israel’s declaration of independence, five Arab nations invaded. Israel survived, but over 700,000 Arab inhabitants of the land — who would later come to identify as Palestinians — fled or were expelled — what they call the Nakba (catastrophe). Israel called it its War of Independence. Details regarding ‘flight’ vs ‘expulsion’ are contested, though Israeli-perpetrated massacres did occur.
  • 1949–1967: The West Bank came under Jordanian control and Gaza under Egyptian control. No Palestinian state was created during this period.
  • 1967: In the Six-Day War, following the massing of Arab armies on Israel’s borders, the closure of the Straits of Tiran by Egypt, and threats of annihilation, Israel launched a pre-emptive strike against Egypt, Syria, and Jordan. In just six days, Israel captured Gaza, the West Bank, East Jerusalem, the Sinai Peninsula, and the Golan Heights. Gaza came under Israeli military occupation, resulting in decades of unrest and resistance.
  • Following the 1967 Six-Day War tensions remained high. In 1973, Egypt and Syria launched a surprise attack on Israel on Yom Kippur in an effort to reclaim lost territory. Despite initial setbacks, Israel managed to repel the offensive. The war triggered a U.S. airlift of supplies to Israel, an OPEC oil embargo, and dramatically altered regional dynamics. It also set the stage for serious diplomacy. In 1979, after years of negotiations, Israel and Egypt signed the Camp David Accords, brokered by the United States. As a result, Israel withdrew fully from the Sinai Peninsula by 1982, dismantling settlements and military installations. This historic move demonstrated that Israel was willing to make significant territorial concessions in exchange for genuine peace — a peace that, despite ups and downs, has largely held between Israel and Egypt ever since.
  • 1987 & 2000: Two major Palestinian uprisings (Intifadas) erupted against Israeli rule. The first led to the rise of Hamas as an alternative to the Palestinian Authority.
  • 1993–2000: The Oslo Accords brought hope for peace and mutual recognition. But the process stalled and eventually collapsed.
  • 2005: Israel withdrew unilaterally from Gaza, forcibly removing all Jewish settlers and military installations. In 2006, Hamas won elections, and by 2007, it seized total control of Gaza in a violent coup after a national unity government coalition was rejected by them.

Timeline of faiths

Judaism’s link to the land predates Christianity and Islam by around 2000 years, but all three faiths have deep, authentic stakes in it.

The 2005 Restrictions, and What Hamas Could Have Done

When Israel withdrew from Gaza in 2005, it (often forcibly) removed every last settler and even exhumed the graves of deceased Israeli citizens — an extraordinary and symbolic act reflecting fears that Jewish graves would be desecrated under Hamas control. At the time, Israel retained control over Gaza’s airspace, maritime borders, and most land crossings, while Egypt controlled the southern Rafah crossing. These controls were not a total blockade but rather security measures designed to prevent the smuggling of weapons and the infiltration of militants. Goods and people still moved through monitored crossings, and international aid programs continued to operate.

This was, in retrospect, a critical window for Gaza. Despite some restrictions — viewed by many as reasonable given the volatility — Hamas had the chance to prove responsible governance: courting investment, strengthening schools and healthcare, and nurturing local industries. Instead, it prioritised militarisation — stockpiling weapons, building tunnel networks, and pursuing confrontation. Since the mid-1990s, tens of billions of dollars in international assistance have gone to the Palestinians (West Bank and Gaza), with substantial flows into Gaza, especially after 2007, to rebuild infrastructure, deliver food and healthcare, and support economic activity. Yet Gaza did not become a modestly developing society. Other places starting from less made more: Rwanda rebuilt via institutions and low corruption; Vietnam opened its economy and lifted millions from poverty; Bangladesh surged in textiles and women’s health and education; even parts of the West Bank under the PA saw comparatively greater stability. Gaza received far more aid per capita than many of these, but the strategic choice to channel resources into rockets and tunnels — coupled with repression and recurrent wars — has kept its people trapped in a cycle of poverty, fear, and ruin.

Who started what: Gaza/West Bank since 2005 (selective)

  • 2005 — Israel withdraws from Gaza. Ends direct occupation; security control of air/sea/crossings remains.
  • 2006 — Hamas wins elections; kidnaps Gilad Shalit. Israel launches Summer Rains; Shalit held until 2011.
  • 2007 — Hamas seizes Gaza from Fatah. Israel–Egypt blockade tightens.
  • 2008 — Ceasefire lapses; rockets resume. Israel launches Cast Lead.
  • 2010 — Gaza flotilla confrontation. Violence aboard Mavi Marmara; UN Palmer Report later upholds legality of the naval blockade but criticises Israel’s force.
  • 2012 — Rocket escalation; Israel targets Ahmed al-Jabari. Pillar of Defense.
  • 2014 — Post-kidnapping escalation. Protective Edge.
  • 2018 — Fence protests (Hamas-backed). Heavy casualties; no strategic gains for Hamas.
  • 2021 — Hamas fires at Jerusalem. Guardian of the Walls.
  • 2022 — Strikes vs. PIJ. Breaking Dawn; Hamas mostly sits out.
  • 2023 — Oct 7 massacre. Full-scale war, mass kidnappings; Gaza humanitarian crisis.

How Hamas Fights — and Why Civilians Suffer

Hamas embeds fighters, rockets, and command nodes in dense civilian areas — homes, schools, mosques, hospitals — while operating an extensive tunnel network beneath neighbourhoods. This is not accidental; it is a strategy that turns civilians into cover, ensuring that any Israeli response is both bloody and globally discredited. Civilian suffering is then leveraged for political gain.

The pattern extends to aid. Fuel earmarked for hospitals is siphoned to tunnels and generators; food and basic supplies are distributed as patronage; construction materials intended for civilian repair are redirected to fortifications. These diversions deepen the crisis, erode trust in relief mechanisms, and help explain why Israel and Egypt insist on inspections and controls at crossings.

Israel frequently issues advance warnings — SMS and phone calls to residents, leaflet drops, mapped evacuation routes, and, at times, ‘roof-knock’ munitions — to reduce civilian harm. Operations are often delayed to allow movement. Yet Hamas routinely impedes evacuations through intimidation and roadblocks, seeking to keep civilians in harm’s way to blunt Israel’s options and amplify outrage. The result is tragically predictable: higher civilian casualties despite precautions.

Blockade Rationale (2007): What Changed After the Hamas Coup

After Hamas seized Gaza in 2007, Israel and Egypt tightened controls to stop weapons and fighters moving in and out. In practice this meant naval interdiction, airspace control, and inspection regimes at crossings. Under the law of naval blockade, controls are lawful if declared, applied impartially, and if humanitarian relief can still flow. Critics call the policy collective punishment; Israel and Egypt cite concrete security needs — a tunnel economy, rocket stockpiles, and the presence of armed groups openly dedicated to ongoing war. The reality is bleak and simple: more Hamas capability = more controls; fewer weapons = fewer controls.

Genocide: Why the label misfires

Terms in context:

Occupation: Control of territory outside a state’s recognized borders. Israel is considered an occupying power in the West Bank (per 4th Geneva Convention). Gaza has been deemed “occupied” by some jurists because Israel still controls airspace and perimeter, though it withdrew troops in 2005.

Blockade: A wartime measure that bars goods or people from entering a territory to deprive an enemy of resources. Legal if (a) formally declared, (b) applied impartially, and © allows humanitarian aid. Israel and Egypt enforce a blockade on Gaza; critics call it “collective punishment,” Israel cites security necessity.

Genocide: Intentional destruction, in whole or substantial part, of a national, ethnic, racial, or religious group. Requires demonstrable intent to eliminate the group; high civilian casualties alone do not meet the threshold.

Apartheid: A system of institutionalised racial domination and oppression. Applied by some activists to Israeli rule; Israel argues the term is inapplicable because Arab citizens vote and hold office, and the West Bank situation is a territorial dispute, not a racial caste system.

Having followed the evidence and arguments presented throughout this piece, the accusation of genocide by Israel in Gaza appears largely moot. Nonetheless, for clarity’s sake, it is worth addressing directly. In recent months, it has become fashionable — particularly in mainstream and social media — to label Israel’s actions as ‘genocide.’ This framing clashes with legal and demographic realities: since 2005 Gaza’s population has grown from roughly 1.4M to 2.3M+, and Israel demonstrably has the capability — but not the intent — to annihilate. Warnings before strikes and the allowance of aid, even when it is diverted by Hamas, also cut against genocidal intent. Civilian suffering is tragic and urgent, but the term ‘genocide’ here misstates both intent and outcome and dilutes a word reserved for humanity’s worst crimes. This misapplication of genocide doesn’t occur in a vacuum — it is both a symptom and a driver of a media environment where Israel is uniquely scrutinised while deadlier Arab-on-Arab wars unfold in relative silence.

Selective outrage: the pattern at a glance

In Syria, UN estimates suggest 300,000+ civilians killed since 2011; in Yemen, ACLED (Armed Conflict Location & Event Data) records over 150,000 deaths since 2014; Sudan’s recent Darfur fighting has killed 15,000+ in a single year; Libya’s conflicts since 2011 have claimed tens of thousands. These disasters receive intermittent coverage compared to the saturation attention whenever Israel is involved. The disparity does not make one set of deaths less tragic — it shows how political narratives, not the scale of suffering, decide which tragedies the world sees. Positions are so entrenched that changing one’s mind — or even expressing nuance — is treated as betrayal. Algorithms reward outrage, not careful thinking, so debate becomes performative: people speak to signal tribe, not to understand. On one side, some insist you must brand Israel a ‘settler-colonial apartheid regime’ or be cast out; on the other, some treat any criticism of Israeli military action as antisemitism or ‘support for terror.’ This purity-test culture makes persuasion almost impossible.

In open societies, anti-Israel protests are often marked by a ferocity — often sliding into antisemitic chants or intimidation — that far exceeds the tone of most pro-Israel rallies. Disturbingly, open or tacit support for Hamas, a movement that glorifies martyrdom and calls for Israel’s destruction, has edged into the mainstream in some academic and activist spaces. That normalisation licenses rhetoric and behaviour that would never be tolerated for other conflicts.

Rights and Freedoms

There is a strong moral case for Palestinian dignity and statehood. But alignment with extremist actors muddies that case. When rallies echo eliminationist slogans or wave flags of terrorist groups, the movement’s moral clarity collapses. The result is not pressure on Israel alone — it is lost credibility for Palestinians who want reform, coexistence, and a viable future.

In Israel, women and LGBTQ+ citizens enjoy legal protections and broad participation in public life. Under Hamas rule in Gaza, women’s rights are curtailed and LGBTQ+ people face repression and fear. It is a stark and often ignored contrast — especially when Western progressive movements reflexively align with actors whose doctrine rejects their own values.

The Other Extreme — Jewish Ultra-Nationalists

A small Israeli fringe embraces ultra-nationalist vigilantism — “price-tag” attacks, inflammatory rhetoric, maximalist claims. History also records grave crimes by Israelis: the Deir Yassin massacre in 1948 by Irgun and Lehi fighters (over a hundred villagers killed), the 1953 Qibya raid by an IDF commando unit that killed dozens of civilians, the 1956 Kafr Qasim massacre by Border Police, the 1994 Cave of the Patriarchs massacre by Baruch Goldstein, and the 2015 Duma arson-murder of the Dawabsheh family by Jewish extremists. In Sabra and Shatila in 1982, the killing was carried out by a Lebanese militia, while Israel’s Kahan Commission found Israel bore indirect responsibility. These acts have been condemned by mainstream Israeli society, with perpetrators prosecuted or formally censured. Crucially, even at their worst, they do not weaponise their own children or embed fighters among civilians. That moral boundary matters. A durable peace requires Israel to keep policing this fringe — just as Palestinians must confront and disempower theirs.

Iran’s Role: Patron of the ‘Resistance’

Iran funds, trains, and arms Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad as part of a proxy strategy to bleed Israel and project regional power. Much of this support runs via the IRGC–Quds Force and Hezbollah training sites in Lebanon/Syria — cash transfers, smuggled components, and know-how that sustain rocket arsenals, tunnels, and UAV capacity. Tehran’s influence is real but not absolute: Hamas retains local autonomy and sometimes diverges from Iranian preferences. Containing this proxy network — through financial interdiction, regional diplomacy, and tighter border controls — and leveraging the Abraham Accords (the US-brokered normalisation between Israel and states such as the UAE, Bahrain, Morocco and Sudan, which creates Arab partners willing to curb Iranian channels and back post-conflict stabilisation) is part of any realistic de-escalation plan.

One State or Two? A Hard Re-Think

The two-state paradigm looks elegant on paper, but is unworkable while groups like Hamas reject a Jewish state in any borders. Some propose a single democratic state with equal rights; Israel already has over two million Arab citizens who vote and serve. Yet a one-state outcome under current Palestinian politics offers no safety for Jews. The deeper obstacle is generational indoctrination that frames Israel’s erasure as righteous — a problem politics alone will not solve.

Hamas’s doctrine of martyrdom and annihilation is cultic, not political; that’s why it must be delegitimised as well as defeated. Lasting peace hinges on killing the idea that Israel must disappear. Extremist ideologies can be defeated; history proves it. Nazism was dismantled by war, tribunals, and decades of de-Nazification. Soviet communism collapsed under sustained economic, ideological, and cultural pressure. Even Pol Pot’s Khmer Rouge was driven into irrelevance once its brutality was exposed and outside support dried up. Hamas’s doctrine of martyrdom and annihilation must meet the same fate — through concerted military containment, relentless ideological delegitimisation, and sustained investment in alternative civic life for Palestinians. It won’t be quick or cheap, but destroying bad ideas never is.

The hard reality is that even a modest move toward ‘more peace and less war’ requires Hamas to be destroyed outright or degraded to the point where it can no longer dictate life in Gaza or veto diplomacy. So long as the organisation’s charter calls for Israel’s eradication, its fighters launch rockets from homes, schools, and hospitals, and its media and education systems perpetuate radicalisation, coexistence is impossible. Israel’s effort to neutralise Hamas will therefore remain protracted and brutal: urban combat amid a vast tunnel network almost guarantees high civilian risk, no matter how many warnings or corridors are offered.

If Hamas falls, the humanitarian catastrophe will still demand immediate corridors, field hospitals, and tightly monitored aid. Equally vital is what follows the fighting. A credible, non-violent authority — most plausibly a reformed Palestinian Authority backed by Arab or international partners — must fill the vacuum, or Gaza could slide into warlordism and the cycle of violence will simply restart. In short, degrading Hamas is the grim prerequisite; the moral challenge is to minimise civilian suffering during that process and to seed a governing alternative the moment the guns fall silent.

On Which Side I Unashamedly Stand

If it wasn’t already clear, let it be now: I support Israel’s right to exist, to defend its citizens, and to ensure its security — rights that should belong to any sovereign nation committed to protecting its people. Acknowledging this does not require pretending Israel is flawless. Like any state, it has made mistakes; innocent lives have been lost that should not have been. Yes, there are extremist elements on the Israeli fringe whose rhetoric and actions are reprehensible and must be condemned. Crucially, though, these individuals neither speak for mainstream Israeli society nor glorify — or weaponise — the deaths of their own families and civilians. They operate under democratic oversight and can be prosecuted by their own courts.

Recognising flaws on both sides does not absolve us of moral judgment. Taking a principled stand is essential; ‘everyone is wrong’ is often a convenient way to avoid responsibility. The suffering of Palestinians is real and deserves compassion, yet much of that suffering is perpetuated by extremist forces within the Islamic world who cynically use the Palestinian cause as a pawn. These actors obstruct peace, hijack resources, and embed themselves among civilians — turning ordinary lives into battlegrounds.

Generation after generation of Palestinian children have been raised in an environment where hatred of Israel is normalised. This indoctrination deepens the conflict and robs young Palestinians of hope and opportunity. Confronting that reality — and supporting efforts to dismantle it — is a moral duty, not an optional nuance.

Despite its imperfections, Israel retains the moral high ground. It is a democracy governed by law and checks and balances; its leaders are elected, not installed by force. Its society — Jews, Muslims, Christians, and Druze alike — lives in a complicated, imperfect, yet functioning pluralism. In such a conflict, neutrality masquerading as fairness only perpetuates injustice. A reasonable, morally responsible stance must be taken — and mine is unambiguously with Israel’s right to defend itself while striving for genuine peace for all innocents on both sides.

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No formal citations included. Facts are stated in good faith; credible corrections welcome and will be incorporated.

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Bio

Peter M. Swanepoel is a postgraduate researcher in history at the University of Johannesburg, focusing on the politics and institutions of South African cycling under apartheid. He is currently funded by the Wellcome Trust (University of Toronto), and is affiliated locally with UJ’s History Department under the supervision of Professor Thembisa Waetjen. Swanepoel co-authored a book with Henning van Aswegen, The Daisy Spy Ring: How South African Intelligence Agents Infiltrated and Disrupted the SA Communist Party (Naledi, 2025). He also writes on politics, history, and society more broadly.