Irregular Forces – State-Backed Insurgencies in Africa
Helmoed Römer Heitman – Nongqai
The most common concept of irregular forces is that of guerrilla forces engaged in insurgency against a government. It is also generally understood and accepted that for an insurgency to be successful it needs, at the very least, a ‘friendly’ border or coastline or support by another state. That support will, however, not always – perhaps not even very often – be altruistic. Countries do what they perceive to be in their interests, economic or strategic.
How Irregular Forces are used by world and regional powers
Thus, the Soviet Union once supported insurgencies and terrorism (the Baader-Meinhoff group, the Brigades Rouge etc) around the world. They did that not because they necessarily approved of their aims, but because it annoyed and imposed costs on the United States and other Western powers. Similarly, the People’s Republic of China supported various insurgencies, including Unita and the Pan Africanist Congress, and the United States supported insurgencies against governments friendly to the Soviet Union, examples including the Mujahideen in Afghanistan, the Contras in Nicaragua and the FNLA and later also Unita in Angola.
Irregular forces have also been used by governments for more practical purposes, for conquest, to ensure friendly government in an adjacent country, to exert influence in other countries, for defence, or simply to pressure a neighbour.
One example might be North Vietnam which used Viet Cong guerrillas supported by growing numbers of regular North Vietnamese Army troops from 1955 in its campaign to conquer and incorporate South Vietnam. Similarly, Indonesia supported insurgency in Dutch New Guinea in 1962 with the aim of incorporating the territory into Indonesia. Indonesia also supported the North Kalimantan National Army 1962 attempted coup in Brunei and insurgency in Sabah and Sarawak backed up by Indonesian special forces from 1963 to 1966 as part of a wider campaign against the establishment of the Federation of Malaysia.
Iran
Iran has long supported irregular forces like Hamas and Hezbollah as a tool to harass Israel and control the government of Lebanon, and the Houthis in Yemen to present Saudi Arabia with a threat to its south and, more recently, to present a threat in the Red Sea. Iran has also supported several irregular forces in Iraq to exert its influence there.
South Africa
Other countries have used irregular forces in a neighbouring country as part of defence strategy. South Africa supported Unita from the mid-1970s as a means of closing some 500 km of border to Swapo infiltration into Namibia and to put pressure on Angolan and Cuban forces to reduce their ability to protect Swapo. South Africa supported Renamo in Mozambique and the Lesotho Liberation Army to pressure those governments to restrict support for ANC efforts to infiltrate South Africa. Renamo was previously supported by Rhodesia to complicate Mozambique’s support for ZANLA infiltration into Rhodesia.
Israel
Similarly, Israel supported the South Lebanon Army from 1982 to 1999 to restrict guerrilla infiltration from Lebanon, and Uganda supported the Sudan People’s Liberation Army from the mid-90s to restrict the activities of the Lord’s Resistance Army which was operating from southern Sudan into northern Uganda.
Other examples of one country supporting insurgency in another country to further their own interests might include:
- Zaire: Supported the FNLA and FLEC in Angola through the 1960s and 1970s and later also Unita, first against Portugal and then against the MPLA government.
- Tanzania: Incorporated elements of the Uganda People’s Congress during the invasion of Uganda in 1979 and supported the National Resistance Army of Yoweri Museveni in its campaign to overthrow the UPC government of Uganda from 1981 to 1986.
- Angola: Used Katangese gendarmes formed into the National Front for the Liberation of the Congo to fight against the FNLA and Unita until 2002, supported their incursions into Zaire in 1977/78 and later used them against the Mobutu government in the First Congo War in 1997.
- Uganda: Supported the Rwandan Patriotic Front from 1987 to 1992 to put a friendly government in place and joined Rwanda in supporting the AFDL in Zaire in 1996/97 and supported the Sudan People’s Liberation Army in South Sudan as part of a strategy to counter LRA and ADF infiltration from there.
- Sudan: Supported the Lord’s Resistance Army and Allied Democratic Forces against Uganda from the mid-90s.
- Cote d’Ivoire: Supported the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) from 1989 to 1997.
- Liberia: Supported the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in Sierra Leone from 1997 to 2002.
- Burkina Faso: Supported both the NPFL in Liberia and the RUF in Sierra Leone.
- Rwanda: Supported several irregular forces in Zaire and the DRC as part of its strategy to counter elements of the Interahamwe and former Rwandan Army that had settled in the east of the DRC and planned insurgency in Rwanda. First supported the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo (AFDL) in 1996/97, then the National Congress for the Defence of the People (CNDP) from 2006 to 2009 and latterly M23.
Private Military Companies
Another type of irregular force that made something of a comeback through the 1990s are private military companies, a more polite term than mercenaries. The first modern iteration of this old profession were, arguably, Mike Hoare’s mercenaries operating in Katanga and later for the Zaire government against the Simba rebellion, together with mercenaries hired by the CIA. More recently Executive Outcomes operated against Unita in Angola and against the RUF in Sierra Leone. Most recently this concept has evolved more into security companies for operations in high-risk areas, for instance in Afghanistan and Iraq.
While generally looked down upon by regular soldiers and decried by many politicians, PMCs can have real uses. Poorer countries that cannot afford to maintain large security forces might see them as a means to gain surge capability in a crisis, without becoming beholden to another country, or as a means to bring in specialized skills, for instance to support complex equipment. Other countries might employ them to provide security assistance to a friendly country without having to commit regular forces. The US employment of PMCs in Afghanistan and Iraq would be a particularly good example of that.
PMCs can also provide other strategic benefits: They can be used as a deniable means to assist another country or even to exert influence in another country, and they can be an excellent source of intelligence. South Africa has denied itself this possibility by its military assistance legislation which means, in effect, that any South African company engaged in such tasks will be considered to have the approval of the government and therefore cannot be in any way deniable.
- Helmoed Heitman
