SAAF HELICOPTERS AS FORCE MULTIPLIERS: LT GEN DENIS JOHN EARP, SSA, SD, SOE, SAAF (RETIRED)

Abstract

On 26 April 2011 Brig Hennie Heymans interviewed Lt-Gen DJ Earp on the use of SAAF-helicopters as a force multiplier in counterinsurgency operations and their use by Koevoet.

Keywords

18th Fighter Bomber wing

1974 the collapse of Portugal

2 Squadron SAAF

32 Battalion

Angola

Counterinsurgency

General CA “Pop” Fraser

Geneva Convention,

Germ warfare

Korea

Operation Savannah

SOE – SA Police Medal

South African Air Force

South African Air Force helicopter crews

Southwest Africa

SWAPO

SWAPO

United Nations Forces

SAAF HELICOPTERS AS FORCE MULTIPLIERS: LT GEN DENIS JOHN EARP, SSA, SD, SOE, SAAF (RETIRED)

Brig HB Heymans (SAP – Ret)

2/Lieut DJ Earp then a young pilot in the SAAF

 

2 Squadron SAAF Pilot POW’s 2Lieutenant’s Michael Ian Bruce Halley, Christoffel Lombard and Denis John Earp photographed after their release from North Korean captivity on 27 July 1953. (Photo courtesy Col Graham du Toit)

In 1951 I was a fighter pilot with number 2 Squadron SAAF in Korea serving with the United Nations Forces. On 27 September 1951 I was shot down by ground fire and then taken prisoner. I spent the next three months in communist hands under extremely horrible conditions.

There was no Geneva Convention, insufficient food, no doctors, no medicine, no acknowledgement of the rank, no rights! There was torture, starvation as a means of punishment, and there was “brain washing”. The West was horrified when fighter pilots from the 18th Fighter Bomber wing confessed, before international journalists, to germ warfare!

By the time I was released on 30 August 1953 in terms of the armistice, I had gained a thorough understanding of how communism worked in practice. And that practice was very, very, different from the theory. During the next few years, I made a point of studying communism and the pattern of deployment of the Soviet Union in South America and Africa in particular.

In 1965 I came under the influence of General CA “Pop” Fraser who was trying to convince other government departments that counterinsurgency was not only the responsibility of the Department of Defence, but the responsibility of all departments of government. By 1966 the opening rounds of the campaign against SWAPO began. By 1968 the pattern of soviet expansionism in Africa was clear. Its support to all liberation movements indicated the probable future course of events in southern Africa

In 1974 the collapse of Portugal accelerated matters, and it became obvious that we would have to face an escalating threat of SWAPO insurgency in Southwest Africa and probably a conventional threat from Angola as the insurgents sheltered there, and from under the protective cover of a conventional force could launch into Southwest Africa to murder farmers and to terrorise the indigenous population. After Operation Savannah in 1975, the establishment of 32 Battalion led to an era of cooperation with the South African Air Force which was very productive of results against terrorists.

However, the relatively small number of helicopters and the multiplicity of tasks, such as casualty evacuation, special operations, and operations with army units, meant that the command and control of operations required careful use of this effort in order not to waste valuable flying hours on non-productive tasks.

When Koevoet was established, it soon proved to be excellent at acquiring intelligence of SWAPO incursions from Angola. The vastness of the country has to be appreciated to understand the problem we faced: miles and miles of rough country and very limited resources of men and material with which to counter the enemy. At the time, the South African Air Force helicopter crews were very well trained, and battle hardened by many operational tours. Battle tactics had evolved to the point where, if the ground troops were reasonably efficient, success against the insurgents was remarkable. Operations with 32 Battalion were particularly effective.

As Koevoet slowly began to prove its battle effectiveness, particularly against SWAPO cross-border incursions, the South African Air Force felt that cooperation with Koevoet in follow up operations would be effective full stop. And this proved to be the case. As Koevoet was closing in on a terrorist group, and contact was imminent, they would call for chopper support, and the result would usually be very successful.

The helicopter crews naturally enjoyed participation in these successful hunts, as they did with 32 Battalion. And the Koevoet crews enjoyed the success that they reflected on them from these joint operations, proving once again that nothing succeeds like success!

The combination of good combat intelligence and direct fighting spirit together with effective helicopter support made for very effective combat operations.

19 May 2011 photo of Lt-Gen Denis Earp by Hennie Heymans

Comments by Hennie Heymans

The late General Jannie Geldenhuys introduced me to Lt-Gen Denis Earp a former head of the SAAF. We had a few very interesting talks.

What impressed me the most was his down to earth common sense and his tremendous personal knowledge of Communism. He would have been an excellent Secretary of the State Security Council or even a Director General of National Intelligence with his firsthand knowledge of Communism.

He told me that he expected the members of the SAAF to be good shots with rifles and/or handguns.

He further told me that once he was in an Officer’s Club in the Operational Area in the company of Mr PW Botha. They were having a beer and when Mr PW Botha asked why the National Servicemen were only have cold drinks, he told them they it was then forbidden for them to drink. Mr PW Botha then said all National Servicemen were to be given two beers a day. (The SA Police also followed the example of two beers a day.)