THE DE WITT COMMISSION – COMMUNITY POLICING

Abstract:  This article examines the origin, development, and ultimate failure of community policing in South Africa, with specific reference to the De Witt Commission of 1988–1989 and the subsequent establishment of the South African Police Service (SAPS). It discusses the theoretical ideal of community policing, the challenges of implementation, and its limited impact over time at the grassroots level. Personal insights are also shared about an early successful initiative after 1994, along with a critical look at the current state of crime control in South Africa in 2025.

Abstrak: Hierdie artikel ondersoek die ontstaan, ontwikkeling en uiteindelike mislukking van gemeenskapspolisiëring in Suid-Afrika, met spesifieke verwysing na die De Witt-kommissie van 1988–1989 en die daaropvolgende stigting van die Suid-Afrikaanse Polisiediens (SAPD). Dit bespreek die teoretiese ideaal van gemeenskapspolisiëring, die uitdagings van implementering en die beperkte impak daarvan oor tyd op voetsoolvlak. Persoonlike insigte word ook gedeel oor ‘n vroeë suksesvolle inisiatief ná 1994, saam met ‘n kritiese blik op die huidige stand van misdaadbeheer in Suid-Afrika in 2025.

Keywords:

1990s political violence

Community policing

Community relations

Crime prevention

De Witt Commission

Internal Stability Division (ISD)

Legitimacy crisis

Mandela inauguration address

Marshalls 1994

Neighbourhood watches

Police culture

Police training

Police–community cooperation

Professor Wilfred Schärf

Reform failure

Regional Commissioners

SAP restructuring

SAP vs. SAPS

South Africa transition era

Visible Policing

THE DE WITT COMMISSION – COMMUNITY POLICING

By Brigadier Fanie Bouwer

Introduction

How did the policy of community policing initially originate within the ranks of the old South African Police (SAP)?

In 1988, former Police Commissioner General Hennie De Witt was appointed overall leader of an investigation into the restructuring of the then SAP.

Some of the committee members included:

• Lt. Gen. Johan Swart, who mostly acted as chairperson.
• Brigadier George Fivaz (from Efficiency Services and later Commissioner of the SAPS)
• Colonel Johan Ferreira (later Lieutenant General)
• Colonel Johan Scholtz
• Colonel Renier Coetzee (a legal expert); and

Names of other committee members are not available.

This commission – also referred to as the De Witt Committee, with subcommittees – submitted a report in 1989, and the recommendations, including those related to community policing, were gradually implemented.

I will also refer to and comment on Janine Rauch (who held a senior policy position in the ANC government and later worked as an independent consultant on community safety, governance and accountability) and her ideas and criticism regarding the implementation of community policing in South Africa.

One of the focal points of the committee’s investigation was indeed community policing, which led to the creation of the SAP’s Community Relations Division.

I will deal with the other aspects investigated in a separate article.

The De Witt Committee’s report was never made a public document.

Community policing, in the context of the restructuring of the South African Police (SAP), was a theoretical ideal that formed part of the broader decentralization process following the De Witt Committee deliberations.

Its aim was to improve the SAP’s relationship with communities, especially in light of its legitimacy crisis due to its historical role as a so-called “instrument of the National Party government.” Perhaps the implementation of the idea was premature in the turbulent early 1990s, but the decision was made to start and push forward.

Many commentators at the time referred to the SAP as an “instrument of apartheid,” but that is a senseless statement. They were often unsure whether they should rather use the term “NP government.” I suspect the use of the word “apartheid” was a cynical choice.

Below, I will give an overview of community policing, the role of Regional Commissioners in it, the challenges, and the limited impact, based on the committee’s recommendations and the historical context.

Background and Context

Theoretically, community policing is a policing model that emphasizes cooperation between the police and local communities to prevent crime, enhance safety, and build trust.

In the context of the old SAP, this approach was a response to the force’s “crisis” (was that word perhaps used as an exaggeration?) of legitimacy, especially among black communities, who viewed the SAP as an oppressive force due to its role in enforcing certain discriminatory laws of the time.

The decentralization process proposed by the committee, including the division into 11 regions under Regional Commissioners, aimed to transform the SAP into a more accessible and accountable entity, with community policing as a (potential) means to achieve this.

The political transition period of the early 1990s, marked by the unbanning of liberation movements (like the ANC) and increasing political violence, further emphasized the need for a more community-oriented approach.

The SAP had to try to reform its image to be seen as a neutral service provider rather than a political instrument.

Community policing was thus part of a broader strategy to redefine the SAP’s role, but its implementation was extremely challenging – challenging in the sense that it introduced an entirely new dimension or aspect of crime prevention that police officers suddenly had to deal with.

Community Policing by the SAP

The De Witt report mentioned community policing as an ideal contained in the reform ideas, particularly in the context of the Uniform Branch, which was responsible for the daily management of approximately a couple of hundred police stations nationwide.

The Uniform Branch, which then formed part of the new Visible Policing Division, was the most likely channel for community policing, as it had direct contact with the public.

Key features of community policing in the SAP’s reforms included:

Emphasis on Crime Prevention, with the Visible Policing Division (established in May 1991 through the merger of the Uniform and Operational Branches) placing strong focus on crime prevention.

Initiatives such as business watches, farm watches, tourist patrols and beach patrols were examples of proactive policing intended to promote community safety.

These initiatives aimed to strengthen the SAP’s presence in communities and improve the public’s perception of the force as a service-oriented institution.

Community Initiatives

Neighbourhood watches and the use of the Police Reserve Force (composed of civilian volunteers) were attempts to involve communities directly in crime prevention. Neighbourhood watches were later actively supported by AfriForum, which invested significant time and money into them.

The report states that in 1990, reservists were used alongside neighbourhood watch schemes to combat crime in residential areas, although their contribution was minimal. The Police Reserve, consisting of former SAP members, was also deployed during unrest and elections, sometimes in cooperation with local communities, to enhance safety.

Training Changes

The report mentioned that new material had to be introduced into the curriculum of the SAP’s training colleges and the new Police Academy at Graaff-Reinet to emphasize the “importance of good relations between the police and the community.” This was an attempt to integrate community policing into SAP training.

The basic training syllabus included subjects such as Police-Public Relations and Citizenship, intended to prepare constables for community interaction. However, this training was limited and not deep enough to bring about meaningful cultural change.

Role of Regional Commissioners

Regional Commissioners, as supervisors of the 11 regions, were to be responsible for the implementation of community policing at the local level. They were assisted by a senior officer holding the new position of Provincial Head: Community Relations.

They had to:

* Coordinate public relations initiatives to improve the SAP’s image, such as press releases and community meetings.

* Encourage local cooperation by motivating police stations and station commanders to work with community leaders and organizations.

* Allocate resources to support community-oriented programs, such as neighbourhood watches.

* Ensure that national policies, such as the emphasis on depoliticization and crime prevention, were translated into actions in their regions that would build community trust.

Challenges of Community Policing

Community policing efforts faced significant challenges, as highlighted in Janine Rauch’s paper “Historical Alienation.”

The SAP’s role in enforcing “apartheid laws,” often violently, had created deep distrust among certain black communities.

Rauch emphasized that the SAP’s “historical alienation from communities” and its “Christian-national professional culture” were the core reasons for its inability to build trust. In my personal opinion, Rauch exaggerated this (concocted) claim.

In black townships, the SAP was often seen as an occupying force rather than a service provider, making community policing very difficult. My own personal experience tells a different story – I can draw on my time as station commander of Khayelitsha in the late 1980s.

Lack of Genuine Community Participation

The De Witt document emphasized that effective reform required a “bottom-up” approach and genuine community participation, which was absent.

There were other criticisms, such as that community policing was largely a “top-down” initiative, with little room for communities to articulate their needs and priorities.

Initiatives like neighbourhood watch schemes were often limited to white or mixed-race neighborhoods and had little penetration in black communities, where the SAP’s presence was seen as intimidating – perhaps evoking memories of the riot units. I myself don’t know of any AfriForum-supported neighbourhood watch in the townships.

Continued “Political Policing”

Despite the official focus on depoliticization (e.g., the merging of the Security Branch and the Detective Service in 1991), the Security Branch allegedly continued to monitor political organizations like the ANC and PAC. It was reported that NGOs had evidence that the Security Branch still operated in the same manner in 1991.

This accusation, which clearly had political overtones, suggested that the SAP’s credibility as a neutral, community-oriented force was somewhat undermined, as communities – especially in black areas – questioned the SAP’s motives. This was a naïve assertion. Considering Operation Vula (1986–1990) and subsequent violence, it would have been reckless if the Security Branch or Crime Intelligence Division (CID) or whoever, didn’t keep an eye on such possible underground activities.

Academics, journalists, and others viewed these kinds of situations through a different lens. Their perceptions as outsiders didn’t always align with the dynamics of practical policing on the ground.

Limited Training and Cultural Change

It was claimed at the time that training within the Uniform Branch – which was to be the core of community policing – was “minimal.” Most constables received only basic training, and promising members were often transferred out of the Uniform Branch to other divisions, like the Detective Service or other branches.

Allegations were made that the SAP’s professional culture – described as “Christian-National” – may have resisted change. This culture, emphasizing white, Afrikaans-speaking values, was said not to be conducive to building relationships with diverse communities. Personally, I believe these assumptions were nonsense.

Political Violence and Unrest

The early years if the 1990s were marked by intense political violence, especially between ANC and Inkatha supporters.

There were also claims that the SAP’s role in riot control, often using military methods, conflicted with the principles of community policing, which require cooperation and dialogue. But such claims were easier said than done by those who viewed matters from the outside in.

Rauch remarked that the SAP’s inability to handle violence effectively was not only a matter of resources, but also due to its lack of community trust, which further hindered the implementation of community policing. This too – an academic judgment, I would say – reflected possible ignorance of what police officers were confronted within such violent situations.

The thinking of commentators versus the actual realities faced by members highlighted these kinds of conflicting views on perception and practice.

Impact of Community Policing

Efforts at community policing in the SAP had limited success. In some regions, especially in white or mixed-race neighbourhoods, initiatives like neighbourhood watch schemes and public relations campaigns had some success in improving the SAP’s visibility and public perception.

The SAP’s historical alienation and continued political activities meant that community policing was often seen as a cosmetic exercise rather than a sincere effort at change. Rauch noted that the legitimacy crisis could not be resolved through “public relations exercises” or limited structural changes.

Historical Context and Significance

The community policing efforts must be seen in the context of South Africa’s transition period (1989–1994). The reforms were planned in the late 1980s but implemented during the early 1990s when the bans on liberation movements were lifted and negotiations for a democratic South Africa began. This period was marked by intense political violence, which seriously challenged the SAP’s ability to act as a neutral and trusted institution.

The community policing ideals were an early attempt to reform the SAP’s role in a changing society, but deep-rooted mistrust and lack of genuine community participation largely undermined these efforts.

Future Reforms

The community policing ideals of this period laid the foundation for the later transformation of the SAP into the South African Police Service (SAPS) in 1995, when community policing became a central focus under the new democratic government.

The SAPS, under the democratic government, implemented programs like Community Policing Forums (CPFs) to directly involve communities in safety initiatives – a direct continuation of the early ideas from the SAP reforms.

My Own First Community Policing Initiative

President Nelson Mandela was elected State President in Parliament on 8 May 1994. Immediately afterward, he and Bishop Desmond Tutu would adress the crowd from one of the verandas of the old City Hall. A gathering of 120,000 people eventually assembled directly across the road on the historic Grand Parade.

The security planning was carried out under my direct command while I was Provincial Head of the Internal Stability Division (ISD).

During the planning, I also involved the leaders of the so‑called “Marshalls” in the townships in the meetings.

In the end, I deployed 800 of the Marshalls in and around the Grand Parade along with more than 2,000 police officers, who all did outstanding work maintaining order. This was the first – and also the largest – community policing effort ever undertaken in South Africa.

Professor Wilfred Schärf, Chair of the so‑called Sub‑Committee on Community Policing of the Western Cape, wrote the following (among other things) to the Regional Commissioner after the operation:

“What deserves special mention is that the acceptance speech (by President Mandela), security arrangements was a first for community policing in the new South Africa in that monitoring and marshalling structures of the local black communities were involved from the outset in the planning, and not only brought on board once the plans had been unilaterally determined. This no doubt added to the success of the management of such a large group of people. Colonel Fanie Bouwer of the Internal Stability Division deserves special acclaim for the brave step in the direction of community policing.”

Final Thoughts

Community policing in the SAP’s reform initiatives of the late 1980s and early 1990s was an ambitious attempt to improve the force’s legitimacy and relationship with communities. This process- or policy – was later eagerly followed by the SAPS.

In Conclusion – An Unhappy Ending

While community policing laid a foundation for later reforms in the SAPS whilst grand dreams were envisioned, I must now fast‑forward approximately 35 years to 2025.

Over the ensuing years, community policing generated great expectation, yet the ultimate outcome turned out to be extremely disappointing.

Without delving into all the details, runaway crime in South Africa across all categories is a deeply disappointing testament to a dream shattered. Community policing as conceived by scholars and thinkers at the time did not yield the desired results for South Africa’s non‑homogeneous society.