
Parliament and Malanga’s role in following criminal prosecutions
A parliamentary inquiry and a criminal prosecution serve different constitutional purposes and can proceed independently without delay.
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A parliamentary inquiry and a criminal prosecution serve different constitutional purposes and can proceed independently without delay.

A police force’s greatest danger is not the criminal outside the gate, but the policeman who opens it from within.

The Madlanga Commission has revealed a depth of systemic corruption and criminal infiltration that suggests South Africa may need a permanent constitutional body to confront these threats.

This article by Dr Ian De Vries examines how persistent political interference has weakened the South African Police Service (SAPS) and contributed to decades of organisational dysfunction. Drawing on historical examples, structural analysis, and current crises highlighted before the Madlanga Commission, De Vries argues that SAPS’s bloated rank system, promotion-for-pay culture, and erosion of experienced officers have severely undermined policing effectiveness. He contends that political meddling—from ministers influencing operational decisions to long standing tensions between commissioners and cabinet members—has become a systemic obstacle to professional policing. De Vries proposes a radical restructuring: abolishing the position of Minister of Police, depoliticising SAPS leadership, and placing accountability under a multi party parliamentary policing committee. This, he argues, would curb unethical political influence, retain expertise, and restore public trust in law enforcement.